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Preface 
 
During my work as a lawyer in Port Sudan, I noticed the scarcity of 
the Sudanese legal materials on carriage by sea.  Also I observed that the 
lawyers refer repeatedly to the Egyptian works although the Hague/Visby 
Rules, the widely wide world applied convention, is based on the English 
common law principles.  From my practice before Port Sudan Civil Courts, I 
felt that so many issues on carriage by sea need to be discussed and clarified.  
On the other hand, Sudan is not a party to any of the carriage by sea 
conventions and there is endeavor to enact a relatively modern legislation 
i.e.  the Bill of the Maritime Code ١٩٩٩, but the Bill has not yet been passed 
by the legislature.  Therefore its provisions need to be examined and 
verified. 
All these factors indicate a very poor concern for the carriage by sea 
in the law circles in Sudan, although the sea carriage has a great effect on the 
international trade and the national economy in the first place, in addition to 
my own desire to know much more about this branch of law.  All these 
encourage me to devote my thesis to the topic of liability of the sea carrier, 
with reference to the two international conventions on carriage by sea, 
namely, the Convention of Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of 
Lading as amended by ١٩٦٨ protocol i.e. the Hague/Visby Rules, and the 
United Nations Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea ١٩٧٨ i.e. Hamburg 
Rules. 
In the thesis I dealt with provisions of the Hague/Visby Rules as 
construed by the English courts.  Thus I referred to so many ancient and 
modern English cases. I compared the provisions of the Hague/Visby Rules 
with the provisions of the carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١, which adopts 
the Hague Rules, and with the Bill of ١٩٩٩.   I faced a real problem in 
referring to Sudanese cases, since the reported cases on carriage by sea are 
markedly few.  Therefore, I relied on my own translation of the unreported 
cases, which are collected by M. Ali Khalifa, in his book, Ahma Elgadaya 
Elbarhria.  Again I faced the problem of cases to be referred to so as to 
construe the Hamburg Rules because of two reasons: First, it is a relatively 
new convention, having come into in force in ١٩٩٢.  Secondly, most of the 
countries which are contracting states to it are civil law countries and even 
English law countries which signed the convention such as U.S.A, have not 
incorporated it into their national laws.  Hence, I referred to the provisions of 
the Hague/Visby Rules as applied by English courts and compared them 
with the provisions of Hamburg Rules. 
To complete this work I referred to the classical books of the common 
law i.e. Carver, Carriage by Sea and Scrutton, On Charterparties and Bills of 
lading.  Also I depended on some new publications i.e. new edition of John 
Wilson on Carriage of Goods by Sea and the newest work of Professor 
Gaskell, Bill of Lading Law and Contracts.  Also I referred to the 
distinguishable opinions of the Canadian Professor Tetley, Marine Cargo 
Claims and some Canadian and American cases.  I do respect his serious 
efforts to construe the Hague/Visby Rules fairly strict to achieve some sort 
of equitable allocation of risks between shipowners and cargo owners. 
 This thesis is divided into four chapters:  
Chapter One defines the term "Carrier".  It discuses the obligations of the 
carrier under the Hague/Visby Rules and the general exception to those 
obligations, in comparison to the basis of liability under Hamburg Rules. 
Chapter Two discusses the scope of liability of the carrier. 
Chapter Three considers the limits of liability and limits of actions.   
 Chapter Four summarizes conclusions and makes recommendations. 
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Abstract 
 
The subject matter of this thesis is the liability of the sea carrier in the 
international carriage of goods by sea.  
Chapter One: discuses the nature of liability of the sea carrier under the 
Hague/Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules. The Hague/Visby Rules define the 
term “Carrier” as including the owner or the charterer who enters into 
contract of carriage with the shipper, while Hamburg Rules widen the 
definition to include any person by whom or on whose name contract of 
carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a shipper.  
The Hague/Visby scheme of liability is built on specific obligations 
by which the carrier is bound, i.e. the obligation to issue a bill of lading, 
obligation to exercise due diligence, to provide a seaworthy ship and the 
obligation of care of cargo. The failure of the carrier in the fulfillment of the 
obligations will expose him to cargo claims by shippers or cargo owners in 
cases of loss or damage to cargo. He will be held as liable for damages 
unless he proves that he is exempted form liability by virtue of one of the 
seventeen exceptions provided for in Article IV. The most significant of 
them are: fire; perils of the sea; force majeure, nautical fault; acts and 
omissions of the shipper.  
Hamburg Rules introduce a relatively simple scheme of liability based 
on the “presumed fault” by the carrier his agents or servants.  Thus in cases 
of loss or damage to cargo the carrier is held to be liable unless he proves 
that he, his servants and agents were not at fault.  
Chapter Two: considers the scope of liability under the Hague/Visby 
Rules.  They cover bills of lading which are issued in contracting state or 
which incorporate the Rules by paramount clause. They cover the 
international outward carriage only. While under Hamburg Rules it is 
immaterial whether or not a bill of lading has been issued.  The Rules cover 
contract of carriage concluded in a contracting state or if the port of loading 
or port of discharge is in a contracting state. Moreover if the optional port of 
discharge is in a contracting state. Similarly, it can be incorporated by 
paramount clause in the bill of lading. Hamburg Rules cover the inward and 
outward international carriage.  
The period of application under the Hague/Visby Rules is limited 
from the time of loading till the time of discharge, i.e. “tackle to tackle” 
period, while Hamburg Rules cover the entire voyage until the goods are 
handed over or put in disposal of the cargo owner.  
The Hague/Visby Rules do not provide for liability in cases of delay 
in delivery.  They exclude the live animals and deck cargo from the 
definition of goods. While Hamburg Rules provide for liability of carrier in 
cases of delay in delivery. They bring all cargoes under their umbrella. Thus 
they provide for liability of the carrier in cases of live animals and deck 
cargo. Both conventions provide for liability for shipment of dangerous 
cargoes. The well known doctrine of deviation under the common law is still 
in use under the Hague/Visby Rules. It operates to hold the carrier as in a 
fundamental breach of contract unless he proves that he deviates to save life 
or property at sea. Hamburg Rules do not recognize the doctrine of 
deviation.  
Chapter Three: considers the limits of liability and limits of actions. 
The same system of calculating the limit of liability is valid under both 
conventions, i.e. the dual system of per package, per kilo. The former is for 
goods with high value compared to their weight, while the latter is suitable 
for bulk cargoes.  
Although the Hague/Visby Rules introduce a provision for calculating 
limit of liability in containerized goods, i.e. according to the items 
enumerated on the bill of lading, the position is still ambiguous. The unit of 
account is Poincare franc which is replaced by the additional Protocol ١٩٧٩ 
by the Special Drawing Right (SDR) and so forth under Hamburg Rules. 
The limits should be broken when the carrier is in default of negligence, 
recklessness or intentional acts.  
Moreover, the carrier cannot be benefited by the limits of liability 
under the Hague/Visby Rules if he is in default i.e. in cases of fundamental 
breach of contract such as deviations or stowage on deck without shippers 
consent.  
The Hague/Visby Rules avail to the cargo owner a one year period to 
institute his claim against shipowner in cases of loss or damage to his cargo. 
Hamburg Rules extend the time bar to be two years and to cover the carriers 
claims and cargo owners too. This time bar covers the judicial and arbitral 
proceedings. A notice for loss is required in both conventions before the 
claim can be instituted, unless a joint survey is done by the master or crew 
member and the cargo owner or his agent. 
Chapter Four: recommends that Sudan should adhere to the Hague/ 
Rules and to take part in the efforts to amend them.  
 
 
  ﺻﺔاﻟﺨﻼ
  
ﺭﻱ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﺄﻥ ﻫـﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤـﺙ ﺤﺒﺎﻟﻨﻅﺭ ﻟﻸﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻅﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺒ 
ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﻤﻨﺎﻗـﺸﺔ ﺍﻟﻨـﺼﻭﺹ . ﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺤل ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺒ ﻨﺎﻗﻴﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟ 
 ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﺘﻭﺤﻴﺩ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋـﺩ ﺍﻻﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔﺍﻟﻤﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺭﻱ ﻓﻲ 
 ﺒﻘﻭﺍﻋـﺩ ﺍﺼﻁﻼﺤﺎﹰ  ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺭﻭﻓﺔ ﻡ٨٦٩١ ﺴﻨﺔ ﺒﺒﺭﻭﺘﻭﻜﻭلﻤﻌﺩﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺒﺴﻨﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺸﺤﻥ ﺍﻟ 
ﻡ ٨٧٩١ ﺍﻷﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻟﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺒـﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺒـﺎﻟﺒﺤﺭ ﻟـﺴﻨﺔ ﺒﺎﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ، ﻭﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﺘﻬﺎ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ 
ﺫﻟﻙ ﻤﻊ ﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ ﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺒـﻀﺎﺌﻊ .  ﺒﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﺍﺼﻁﻼﺤﺎﹰﻭﺍﻟﻤﻌﺭﻭﻓﺔ 
ﻋﻠﻰ ﻀﻭﺀ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺴﻴﺘﻡ ﻭ.  ﻗﺒل ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺩﻴل ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﺒﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻩ ﻴﻁﺒﻕ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ١٥٩١ﺒﺎﻟﺒﺤﺭ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ 
 ﻌﻠﻴـﻕ ﻡ ﺒﺎﻟﻨﻘـﺎﺵ ﻭﺍﻟﺘ ٩٩٩١ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﻤﺸﺭﻭﻉ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ 
  .ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﺘﺴﺎﻗﻪ ﻤﻊ  ﻤﺩﻯ ﻟﻠﻨﻅﺭ ﻓﻲ
 ﺍﻟـﺴﻔﻴﻨﺔ ﺃﻭ  ﻤﺎﻟـﻙ  ﺒﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﺘﺸﻤل ﻨﺎﻗل ﻜﻠﻤﺔ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻟﻘﺩ ﻋﺭﻓﺕ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ 
 ﺒﺄﻨـﻪ " لﺎﻗﻨ"ﺒﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻋﺭﻓﺕ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ . ﻤﺴﺘﺄﺠﺭﻫﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻴﺒﺭﻡ ﻋﻘﺩ ﻨﻘل ﻤﻊ ﺸﺎﺤﻥ 
 ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺃﺘﺕﻭﻗﺩ . ﻜل ﺸﺨﺹ ﺃﺒﺭﻡ ﻋﻘﺩﺍﹰ ﺃﻭ ﺃﺒﺭﻡ ﺒﺎﺴﻤﻪ ﻋﻘﺩ ﻤﻊ ﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﻟﻨﻘل ﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺒﺤﺭﺍﹰ 
ﻭﻋﺭﻓﺘﻪ ﺒﺄﻨﻪ ﻜل ﺸﺨﺹ ﻋﻬﺩ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل " ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺍﻟﻔﻌﻠﻲ " ﺠﺩﻴﺩ ﻫﻭ ﺒﺎﺼﻁﻼﺡﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ 
ﺘﻨﻔﻴﺫ ﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺃﻭ ﺒﺘﻨﻔﻴﺫ ﺠﺯﺀ ﻤﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻘل، ﻭﻜﺫﻟﻙ ﺃﻱ ﺸﺨﺹ ﺁﺨﺭ ﻴﻌﻬﺩ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺒﻤﺜل 
  .ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺫ
 ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺒـﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺯﺍﻤﺎﺕ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ  ١ﺤﺩﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺘ
 ﺒﺎﻟﺭﺠـﺎل ﻴﺯﻭﺩﻫـﺎ ل ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺠﺏ ﺤﺘﻰ ﺘﺼﺒﺢ ﺍﻟﺴﻔﻴﻨﺔ ﺼـﺎﻟﺤﺔ ﻟﻺﺒﺤـﺎﺭ، ﻭﺃﻥ ﺫﻴﺒ
ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﻤـﻥ  ٢ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻌﺩﺍﺕ ﺒﺸﻜل ﻤﻼﺌﻡ ﻗﺒل ﻭﻓﻲ ﺒﺩﺍﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻠﺔ ﻭﺘﺘﻁﻠﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻋﺩﺓ 
 ﺘـﺴﺘﻴﻔﻬﺎ ﺘﺤﻤﻴل ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻘﻭﻟـﺔ ﻭﻤﻨﺎﻭﻟﺘﻬـﺎ ﻭ ﺒﺸﻜل ﻤﻼﺌﻡ ﻭﺒﻌﻨﺎﻴﺔ ﺒ "ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺃﻥ ﻴﻘﻭﻡ 
 ﻟﺴﺒﻌﺔ ﺍﻻﻟﺘﺯﺍﻤﺎﺕﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺘﺨﻀﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺒﻌﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ . “ﻔﺭﻴﻐﻬﺎﻭﺤﻤﻠﻬﺎ ﻭﺤﻔﻅﻬﺎ ﻭﺭﻋﺎﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﻭﺘ 
 ﺒﻤﻭﺠﺒﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺩﺩ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻻﺕ ﺃﻫﻤﻬﺎ ﺤـﺎﻻﺕ ﻴﻌﻔﻰﻋﺸﺭ ﺍﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎﺀﺍﹰ 
ﺄ ﺍﻟﻤﻼﺤـﻲ ﻭﺨﻁـﺄ ، ﺍﻟﺨﻁ ﺎﻫﺭﺓﺴﺒﺏ ﻤﺨﺎﻁﺭ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺭ، ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺓ ﺍﻟﻘ ﺒﺘﻠﻑ ﺃﻭ ﻫﻼﻙ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﻋﺔ 
ﻭﻗﺩ ﺘﻌﺭﻀﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺼﻭﺹ ﻟﻨﻘﺩ ﻭﺍﺴـﻊ ﺘﺭﻜـﺯ ﻓـﻲ ﺘﻌﻘﻴـﺩﻫﺎ ﻭﻓـﻲ ﺃﻥ . ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺤﻥ
 ﻜﺜﻴﺭﺓ ﻭﻤﺘﺩﺍﺨﻠﺔ ﻭﺒﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻻ ﻀﺭﻭﺭﺓ ﻟﻪ ﺒﺎﻟﻨﻅﺭ ﻟﺘﻁـﻭﺭ ﺼـﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻘـل ﺍﻻﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎﺀﺍﺕ
  .ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺭﻱ ﻤﺜل ﺍﻹﻋﻔﺎﺀ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺨﻁﺄ ﺍﻟﻤﻼﺤﻲ
ﻭﻗﺩ ﺍﻋﺘﻤﺩﺕ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻤﺒﺩﺃ ﺍﻟﺨﻁـﺄ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻹﻫﻤـﺎل ﺍﻟﻤﻔﺘـﺭﺽ ﻜﺄﺴـﺎﺱ 
ﺇﺫ ﻴﺴﺄل ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺨﺴﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺘﺠﺔ ﻋﻥ ﻫﻼﻙ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺃﻭ ﺘﻠﻔﻬـﺎ، ﺇﺫﺍ . ﻟﻨﺎﻗلﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍ 
ﻭﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺘﺴﺒﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻬﻼﻙ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺘﻠﻑ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺨﻴﺭ ﺃﺜﻨﺎﺀ ﻭﺠـﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﺒـﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻓـﻲ 
ﻩ ﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﻤﺎ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻤـﻥ ﺅﻟﻡ ﻴﺜﺒﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺃﻨﻪ ﻗﺩ ﺃﺘﺨﺫ ﻫﻭ ﺃﻭ ﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻤﻭﻩ ﺃﻭ ﻭﻜﻼ ﻤﺎ ﻋﻬﺩﺘﻪ، 
  . ﻟﺘﺠﻨﺏ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﺙ ﻭﺘﺒﻌﺎﺘﻪﺍﺘﺨﺎﺫﻩﺍﻟﻤﻌﻘﻭل 
ﺩﺓ ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗـل ﻤ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ( ﻫـ)ﺘﻨﺹ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ 
ﺘﻔﺭﻴﻐﻬـﺎ ﺘﻤﺘﺩ ﻤﻥ ﻭﻗﺕ ﺘﺤﻤﻴل ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻅﻬﺭ ﺍﻟﺴﻔﻴﻨﺔ ﻭﺤﺘﻰ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻴﺘﻡ ﻓﻴﻪ 
ﻭﺘﻜﻤـل ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﺩﺓ ". ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻓﺎﻉ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻓﺎﻉ " ﻤﻥ ﺍﺼﻁﻼﺤﺎ ﺎﻭﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻴﻬ . ﺔﻨﻴﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻔ 
ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩ ﺨﺎﺭﺝ ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺘﻪ ﺍﻹﻟﺯﺍﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﺘﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺯﻤﻨﻴـﺔ ﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺒﺄﻥ ﺘﺠﻴﺯ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﻗل ﺒﻌﺍﻟﺴﺎ
ﺒﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺘﻌﺘﺒـﺭ . ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺘﺤﻤﻴل ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻅﻬﺭ ﺍﻟﺴﻔﻴﻨﺔ ﻭﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺒﻌﺩ ﺘﻔﺭﻴﻐﻬﺎ ﻤﻨﻬﺎ 
 ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻻﹰ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺨﻼل ﺍﻟﻤﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻜﻭﻥ ﻓﻴﻬـﺎ ٤ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ 
ﻠﻘـﻰ ﻓﻴـﻪ ﻴﺘﺍﻟﻭﻗـﺕ ﺍﻟـﺫﻱ ﺍﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﺍﹰ ﻤﻥ "ﻭﺘﻌﺭﻑ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﺓ ﺒﺄﻨﻬﺎ . ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺩﺘﻪ 
ﻤﻴﻨـﺎﺀ "ﻭﺤﺘﻰ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻴﻘﻭﻡ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺒﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺒـﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻓـﻲ " ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻴﻨﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺸﺤﻥ 
  ".ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺭﻴﻎ
 ﺘﻠﺯﻡ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺒﺈﺼﺩﺍﺭ ﺴﻨﺩ ﺸﺤﻥ ﻴﺜﺒـﺕ ﻀـﻤﻥ ﺒﻴﺎﻨـﺎﺕ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﺇﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ 
.  ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻅـﺎﻫﺭﺓ ﻟﻠﺒـﻀﺎﻋﺔ ﻴﺜﺒﺕ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺃﺨﺭﻯ ﻭﺯﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﻋﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻜﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﺃﻭ ﻋﺩﺩﻫﺎ ﻜﻤﺎ 
 ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻐﻁﺎﺓ ﺒﺴﻨﺩ ﺸﺤﻥ ﺎﻗﺩﺓل ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻤﻭﺍﻨﺊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌ  ﻜ ﻰﻭﻫﻲ ﺘﻨﻁﺒﻕ ﻋﻠ 
  ﻭﻟـﺫﻟﻙ ﻓـﺄﻥ . ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺒﺘﻀﻤﻴﻥ ﺸﺭﻁ ﺒﺎﺭﺍﻤﻭﻨﺕ ﺍﻨﻁﺒﺎﻕﺃﻭ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻨﺹ ﺴﻨﺩ ﺍﻟﺸﺤﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ 
ﻓﻲ ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻘﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﺼﺩﺍﺭ ﺴﻨﺩ ﺸﺤﻥ ﻭﻻ ﺘﻨﻁﺒﻕ ﻓﻲ ﺤـﺎﻻﺕ ﺘﻌﺘﻤﺩ  ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ 
ﺎ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻓـﻼ ﺃﻤ .ﺭ ﺼﺩﻭﺭﻩ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻻ ﻴﺼﺩﺭ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺴﻨﺩ ﺍﻟﺸﺤﻥ ﻭﻻ ﻴﺘﺼ 
 ﺇﺼﺩﺍﺭ ﺴﻨﺩ ﺸﺤﻥ ﺒل ﺃﻨﻬﺎ ﺘﻨﻁﺒﻕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺭﻱ ﻤﻁﻠﻘﺎﹰ ﺴﻭﺍﺀ ﻻﻨﻁﺒﺎﻗﻬﺎﺘﺘﻁﻠﺏ 
  .ﺃﺼﺩﺭ ﺴﻨﺩ ﺸﺤﻥ ﺃﻡ ﻻ
ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺨﻴﺭ ﻓـﻲ ( ١ )٥ﺘﻨﺹ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ 
ﺇﺫﺍ ﻟﻡ ﺘﺴﻠﻡ " ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺨﻴﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﻴﻘﻊ ﺃﻭﻻﹰ ﺃﻥﻋﻠﻰ ( ٢ )٥ﻭﺘﻨﺹ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ . ﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ 
ﻭﺘﻨﺹ ﺃﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻨﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻟﻡ ﻴﺫﻜﺭ ﻓﻲ ". ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺩﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﻬﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻔﻕ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺼﺭﺍﺤﺔ 
ﻓﻲ ﺤﺩﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﻬﻠـﺔ ﺍﻟﺘـﻲ "ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ ﻭﻗﺕ ﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﻤﺤﺩﺩ ﺃﻭ ﻓﺘﺭﺓ ﻤﺤﺩﺩﺓ ﻴﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ 
ﺍﻋﺎﺓ ﻅـﺭﻭﻑ ﻜـل ﻅ ﻤﻊ ﻤﺭ ﻘﻴﻜﻭﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻘﻭل ﺘﻁﻠﺏ ﺃﺘﻤﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﺨﻼﻟﻬﺎ ﻤﻥ ﻨﺎﻗل ﻴ 
  .ﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺨﻴﺭﺒ ﺃﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲﻻ ﺘﻘﺩﻡ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ". ﺤﺎﻟﺔ
ﻨﻘـل ( ﺝ) ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﻭﻟـﻰ ﻻ ﺘﻐﻁﻲ ﻭﻓﻘﺎﹰ ﻷﺤﻜﺎﻡ  ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ  ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻜﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ 
( ٥ )٥ﺒﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﺩﺓ .  ﻭﻻ ﺍﻟﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻔﻕ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺴﻁﺢ ﺍﻟﺴﻔﻴﻨﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﻴﺔﺍﻟﺤﻴﻭﺍﻨﺎﺕ 
ﺇﺫﺍ ﺃﺜﺒﺕ " ﺍﻟﺨﻁﺄ ﺍﻟﻤﻔﺘﺭﺽ "ﻬﺎ ﻟﻘﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺤﻴﺔ ﻭﺘﺨﻀﻌ  ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻨﻘل ﺍﻟﺤﻴﻭﺍﻨﺎﺕ 
ﺘﻘـﺩﻡ ﺃﺤﻜﺎﻤـﺎﹰ ( ٩)ﻜﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﺩﺓ .  ﺒﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﻨﻘﻠﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﺯﻡﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺃﻨﻪ 
ﺃ ﺩﻤﻔﺼﻠﺔ ﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺤﻭﻨﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﻁﺢ ﻭﺘﺨﻀﻌﻬﺎ ﺃﻴـﻀﺎﹰ ﻟﻤﺒ  ـ
  . ﺍﻟﺨﻁﺄ ﺍﻟﻤﻔﺘﺭﺽ
ﺍﻟﺒـﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻟﺨﻁـﺭﺓ، ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﺩﺓ  ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻤﻔﺼﻠﺔ ﺤﻭل ﺸﺤﻥ ﺍﻻﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺘﺎﻥﺘﺸﺘﻤل 
 ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ، ﻭﻫـﻲ ﺘﻌﻁـﻲ ٣١ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ ( ٦)ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺒﻌﺔ 
ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺍﻟﺤﻕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻠﺹ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻟﺨﻁﺭﺓ ﺃﻭ ﺇﺯﺍﻟﺔ ﺨﻁﻭﺭﺘﻬﺎ ﺒـﺩﻭﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻴـﺴﺘﺤﻕ 
ﺃﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻻﺕ .  ﻤﻭﺍﻓﻘﺘﻪ ﺃﻭﺘﻌﻭﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺸﺤﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻟﺨﻁﺭﺓ ﺒﻌﻠﻤﻪ 
ﺃﻭ ﻤﻭﺍﻓﻘﺘﻪ ﻓﻤﻥ ﺤﻘﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻠﺹ ﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﺃﻭ ﺇﺯﺍﻟﺔ ﺨﻁﻭﺭﺘﻬﺎ ﻤﻊ ﻤﻁﺎﻟﺒﺘـﻪ ﺸﺤﻨﻬﺎ ﺒﺩﻭﻥ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ 
ﻟﻠﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻌﻭﻴﺽ ﻋﻥ ﺃﻱ ﺘﻠﻑ ﻴﻨﺠﻡ ﻋﻥ ﺸـﺤﻨﻬﺎ ﻟﻠـﺴﻔﻴﻨﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻟﻠﺒـﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻷﺨـﺭﻯ 
  .ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺤﻭﻨﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ
 ﻋـﻥ ﺍﻻﻨﺤـﺭﺍﻑ )ﺘﺄﺨﺫ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﺒﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻻﺕ 
ﻱ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻌﺘﺒﺭﻩ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺍﺒﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﻔـﺴﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺍﻹﻨﺠﻠﻴﺯ ( ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺎﺭ
 ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴـﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎﺀﺍﺕ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﻭﻉ ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻔﺎﺩﺓﻟﻬﺎ ﺇﺨﻼﻻﹰ ﺃﺴﺎﺴﻴﺎﹰ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩ ﻴﻤﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻤﻥ 
ﺃﻤـﺎ ﻗﻭﺍﻋـﺩ .  ﺍﻷﺭﻭﺍﺡ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ ﻓـﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺤـﺭ ﺇﻨﻘﺎﺫﺍﻟﻤﻜﻔﻭﻟﺔ ﻟﻪ ﺇﻻ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻜﺎﻥ ﺒﻐﺭﺽ 
ﻟﻙ ﻴﻌﻨﻲ ﺃﻥ ﻭﺫ. ﺒﺸﻜﻠﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺭﻭﻑ (  ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺎﺭ ﺍﻻﻨﺤﺭﺍﻑ)ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻓﻼ ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ 
 ﻻ ﻤﺤل ﻟﻪ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺇﻻ ﺒﻘﺩﺭ ﻤـﺎ ﺍﻻﻨﺤﺭﺍﻑ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺍﻻﻨﺤﺭﺍﻑﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻗﺩ ﺃﻟﻐﺕ ﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ 
  .ﻴﺘﺴﺒﺏ ﻓﻲ ﻫﻼﻙ ﺃﻭ ﺘﻠﻑ ﺍﻟﺒﻀﺎﺌﻊ
ﺘﻌﺘﻤﺩ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻨﻅﺎﻤﺎﹰ ﺜﻨﺎﺌﻴﺎﹰ ﻟﺤﺴﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻁﺭﺩ ﺃﻭ ﻋـﻥ 
ﻴـﻪ  ﺠﻨ ٠٠١ﻭﻗﺩ ﺤﺩﺩﺕ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﺤﺩﻭﺩ ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺒـ  ـ. ﻜل ﻜﻴﻠﻭ ﻏﺭﺍﻡ 
ﻭﻗﺩ ﺍﺴﺘﻌﺎﺽ ﺒﺭﺘﻭﻜـﻭل ﻓـﺴﺒﻲ ﻋـﻥ . ﺇﺴﺘﺭﻟﻴﻨﻲ ﺫﻫﺏ ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻁﺭﺩ ﺃﻭ ﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﺸﺤﻥ 
ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻭﻴﻡ ﺒﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﺴﺘﺭﻟﻴﻨﻲ ﺒﺤﺩﻭﺩ ﻤﻘﻭﻤﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻔﺭﻨﻙ ﺒﻭﻨﻜﺎﺭﻴـﺔ ﺜـﻡ ﺍﺴـﺘﺒﺩل ﺒﺭﺘﻭﻜـﻭل 
ﻭﻗـﺩ ﺤـﺩﺩ . ﻡ، ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻤﻭل ﺒﻪ ﺤﺎﻟﻴﺎﹰ، ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻨﻙ ﺒﻭﻨﻜﺎﺭﻴﺔ ﺒﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻟﺴﺤﺏ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺼـﺔ ٩٧٩١
ﺍﻟﺴﺤﺏ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ، ﻜﻤﺎ ﻴﺤﺩﺩﻩ  ﻤﻥ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ٧٦,٦٦٦ﻡ ﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺒ  ـ٩٧٩١ﺒﺭﺘﻭﻜﻭل 
 ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻜﻴﻠﻭ ﻏـﺭﺍﻡ ﺃﻴﻬﻤـﺎ  ﻭﺤﺩﺘﻴﻥ ﺼﻨﺩﻭﻕ ﺍﻟﻨﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ، ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻁﺭﺩ ﺃﻭ ﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﺃﻭ 
 ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺜﻨﺎﺌﻲ ﻟﻠﺤﺴﺎﺏ ﻋﻥ ﺍﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔﻤﻥ ( ﺃ( )١ )٦ﻭﻗﺩ ﺃﺒﻘﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ . ﺃﻜﺒﺭ
ﻭﺘﺤﺩﺩ ﺃﻗﺼﻰ ﻤـﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ . ﻜل ﻁﺭﺩ ﺃﻭ ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻜﻴﻠﻭ ﻏﺭﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺃﻨﺸﺄﻩ ﺒﺭﺘﻭﻜﻭل ﻓﺴﺒﻲ 
ﻭﺤـﺩﺓ  )٥,٢ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻁﺭﺩ ﺃﻭ ﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﺸـﺤﻥ ﺃﻭ ( ﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﺤﺴﺎﺒﻴﺔ  )٥٣٨ﻴﻌﺎﺩل ﻟﻠﻨﺎﻗل ﺒﻤﺎ 
  .ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﻜﻴﻠﻭ ﻏﺭﺍﻡ( ﺤﺴﺎﺒﻴﺔ
ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ( ١ )٨ﺎﺩﺓ ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻤ ( ﺝ )٥ﻭﻓﻘﺎﹰ ﻟﻠﻤﺎﺩﺓ 
 ﺍﻟﻬـﻼﻙ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺘﻠـﻑ ﺃﻭ ﺃﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺜﺒـﺕ ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻔﺎﺩﺓ ﻻ ﻴﺤﻕ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﻗل ﻓﺄﻨﻪ
 ﺘﻘﺼﻴﺭﻩ ﺃﻭ ﺃﺭﺘﻜﺒﻪ ﺒﻘـﺼﺩ ﺃﻭ ﺒﺈﻫﻤـﺎل ﻭﻋﻠـﻡ ﺃﻭﺞ ﻋﻥ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺨﻴﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﻡ ﻗﺩ ﻨﺘ 
ﺃﻀﻑ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻓﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺍﺒﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﻔﺴﺭﺓ ﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ . ﺒﺎﺤﺘﻤﺎل ﺃﻥ ﻴﻨﺘﺞ ﺍﻟﻬﻼﻙ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺘﻠﻑ 
 ﻤﻥ ﺤﺩﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻹﺨـﻼل ﺍﻟﺠـﻭﻫﺭﻱ ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻔﺎﺩﺓﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﺘﺤﺭﻡ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻤﻥ 
 ﺍﻻﻨﺤـﺭﺍﻑ  ﺍﻟﺴﻁﺢ ﺃﻭ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺩ ﻤﺜل ﺍﻟﺘﻠﻑ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻬﻼﻙ ﺒﺴﺒﺏ ﺍﻟﺸﺤﻥ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺄﺫﻭﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ 
  .ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺎﺭ
ﺘﻨﺹ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻻﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺴﺒﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺩﺓ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﺤﺩ ﻟﺘﻘﺎﺩﻡ ﺩﻋﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻓﻭﻋﺔ 
ﻭﻗﺩ ﻤﺩﺩﺕ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﻤﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻘـﺎﺩﻡ ﻟﻌـﺎﻤﻴﻥ ﻭﺃﺩﺨﻠـﺕ . ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل 
ﻭﻗـﺩ ﻋﺭﻓـﺕ ﺍﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴـﺔ .  ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻓﻭﻋﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻨﻁﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺎﺩﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻋﺎﻭﻯ
 ﻜـل ﺍﺸﺘﺭﻁﺕﻭﻗﺩ .  ﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎﺌﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺤﻜﻴﻡ ﺍﻹﺠﺭﺍﺀﺍﺕ ﺒﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﺘﺸﻤل ﻫﺎﻤﺒﻭﺭﺝ ﺍﻟﺩﻋﻭﻯ 
 ﻴﺘﻡ ﺭﻓﻊ ﺍﻟـﺩﻋﻭﻯ ﺇﻻ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺃﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻴﺘﻡ ﺃﺨﻁﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻠﻑ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻬﻼﻙ ﻗﺒل ﺍﻻﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺘﻴﻥﻤﻥ 
 .ﺘﻡ ﻤﺴﺢ ﻤﺸﺘﺭﻙ ﻟﻠﺒﻀﺎﻋﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻗﺒل ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺤﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺎﻗل ﺃﻭ ﻤﻥ ﻴﻤﺜﻠﻬﻤﺎ
Chapter One 
Nature of Liability of the Sea Carrier 
 
In this chapter I will consider the nature of liability of the carrier.  I 
will define (the carrier), and then discuss his duties which are: obligation to 
issue a bill of lading, obligation to provide a seaworthy ship, obligation of 
care of cargo and the exceptions to those obligations.  Reference will be 
made to both Hague/Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules.  An attempt will be 
made to compare and contrast these two conventions. 
  ١- Definition of the Carrier:  
              The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ as well as the Hague and 
Hague/Visby Rules١ define the “carrier" as including “the owner or the 
charterer who enters into contract of carriage with a shipper". This is not 
particularly clear or exhaustive definition.  Hence in most cases the 
difficulty of identifying the carrier has arisen, because the carrier is rarely 
identified in the bills of lading. Normally the bill of lading is signed by the 
master or on his behalf, and such a bill of lading, binds the owner of the 
vessel for whom the master acts, and he assumes responsibilities as the 
carrier. The only exception appears to be the case where the master is 
                                                 
١- Art. ١ (a). 
employed directly by a demise charterer and there is a clear notice that the 
master is the servant of the charterer alone. Even when the charterer signs  
 
as agent for the master the owner is still bound, because the master is the 
employer or in effect agent of the owner. On the other hand, the charterer 
is identified as the carrier when there is a demise charter or when the 
charterer contracts in his own name with the shipper, making his own private 
arrangements with the owner for the carriage. As in Baumoll Manufacture 
Von Carl Scheibler v. Furness٢٢, the Charterparty provided for the hire of the 
ship for four months, the charterer to occupy the ship’s store and pay for the 
master and crew, insurance and maintenance of the ship to be paid by the 
shipowners who reserved power to appoint the chief engineer. The master 
had signed bills of lading in respect of goods shipped by shippers who were 
ignorant of the charterparty. It was held that the charterparty amounted to a 
demise because the possession and control of the ship vested in the charterer. 
The shipowner was therefore not liable for the loss of the goods. It would 
seem that the charterer is common carrier and accepts in the charterparty 
some of the responsibilities of the carrier under the Hague Rules. Usually the 
charterer is responsible for loading, stowing, discharging during the course 
                                                 
٢ - (١٨٩٣), ٦٨ L.T.  
of the voyage and is therefore carrier within the definition of the Rules. One 
gathers that under The Hague Rules the charterer can be identified as a 
carrier whenever it acts as such, and this is a question of fact to be decided 
on the facts of each case٣.  
            The joint and several liabilities of owners and charterers were 
specifically addressed in the Canadian case of Canstrand Industries ltd v. 
The “ Lara S”٤, in which a bill of lading was on charterer’s form and had at 
the top the charterer business style “Kimberly line “. The bill of lading was 
signed “Kimberly line “by charterer`s port agent for the Master". The port 
agent had written authorization from the Master to sign the bills of lading on 
his behalf. On these facts the trial judge found the charterer was in fact 
contracting party to the bill of lading and liable as a carrier. She further 
found that under Canadian law because the vessel was not under time 
charter and the bills of lading were signed on behalf the master that the 
shipowner was liable as a carrier. The trial judge referred to professor 
Tetley’s opinion that both the charterer and shipowner should be jointly 
liable as carriers. 
    Under Hamburg Rules Article ١ “carrier" means “any person by 
whom or in whose name contract of carriage of goods by sea has been 
                                                 
٣ - Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, ٥٠-٥١ (١٩٦٥). 
٤ - ١٩٩٣) ٢ F.C.R.٥٥٣.affirmed (١٩٩٤) F.C.J.No .١٦٥٢. 
concluded with the shipper". “The carrier" under Hamburg Rules may 
include the shipowner, charterer or agent of the shipowner, thus it is wider 
than the definition of the “carrier “ under the Hague/Visby Rules, but the 
real contribution of Hamburg Rules is the definition of the “actual carrier"  
in Article ١ (٢). It means "any person to whom the performance of the 
carriage of goods, or of part of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded 
with the carrier, or any person by whom or in whose name or on whose 
behalf the goods are actually delivered to the carrier in relation to the 
contract of carriage by sea”. If we read this definition in the light of the 
provision of Article ١٠٥ we note that the actual carrier assumes the 
responsibility of the contracting carrier for the part of carriage performed by 
him therefore both of them may be liable jointly and severally. 
         One of the shortcomings of The Draft Bill of ١٩٩٩ is that it does not 
define “the carrier", but it provides in section ١٦٩ that the provisions of the 
Hague/Visby Rules should prevail if it conflicts with the provision of the 
Bill.  Thus one can gather that the definition of The Act of ١٩٥١ will 
continue to be in use under the Bill of ١٩٩٩.  
٢- Obligations of the Carrier under the Hague/Visby Rules: 
                                                 
٥ - Art ١٠ (١) provides” When the performance of the carriage or part thereof has been entrusted to an 
actual carrier, whether or not in  pursuance of a liberty clause under the contract of carriage by Sea to do so, 
carrier nevertheless remains responsible for the entire carriage …. etc. 
i. Obligation to issue a bill of lading: 
 Article III rule ٣ of the Hague/Visby Rules requires the carrier to 
issue, on demand, to shipper a bill of lading which shows: 
١. The leading marks necessary to identify the goods. 
٢. The number of packages or pieces or the quantity or weight of the 
cargo. 
٣. The apparent order and condition of the goods. 
Such representations of facts have an important commercial effect.  
First, they form a basis of any cargo claim by the receiver in cases of short 
delivery or damage.  Secondly, where the goods have been sold c.i.f under 
the terms of such contract payment has to be made against delivery of 
documents.  The buyer is entitled to reject the documents if the description 
of goods in the bill does not correspond with their description in the sales 
invoice.  Similarly, the terms of the c.i.f contract might entitle the buyer or 
the bank to insist on the production of a "clean bill", i.e. a bill containing an 
unqualified statement that the goods had been shipped in good order and 
condition.  Thirdly, such statement of facts might seriously affect the 
negotiability of the bill in the hands of consignee, since the goods would not 
readily be saleable in transit if the bill disclosed that they have been shipped 
in a damaged condition. 
a- Statement as to leading marks: 
For a long time it was established in the common law that the leading 
marks which the shipowner or his employees is to insert in the bill is that of 
commercial significance which were essential to identity of the goods.٦  In 
Parson V. New Zealand Shipping Co,٧ frozen carcases of lamb were shipped 
and the bill signed by the shipmaster's agents, described the goods as "٦٢٢x, 
٦٠٨ carcases, ٤٨٨x ٢٢٦ carcases".  On arrival some carcases were found to 
be marked ٥٢٢x and others ٣٨٨x.  The endorsees of the bill claimed that the 
shipowners were estopped from denying the statement in the bill and were 
liable for failing to deliver the carcases shipped.  It was held by the majority 
of the Court of Appeal, that the description of the goods in the bills of lading 
did not affect or denote the nature, quantity or commercial value of the 
goods, and that the shipowners were not precluded from showing that there 
was a mistake in the description, and that the goods formed a portion of 
those in fact shipped.  As against the shipowner the master has no apparent 
authority to insert statement indicating the quality of goods, since in the 
majority of cases he clearly does not possess the commercial knowledge or 
expertise necessary to conduct an adequate check on their accuracy٨.  Thus 
                                                 
٦- John F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods By Sea, ١٢٢ (٤th ed. ٢٠٠١). 
٧- (١٩٠١) IKB ٢٤٨; cited in lvamy, Case Book on Carriage by Sea, ٤٧ (٢nd ed. ١٩٧١). 
٨-  Wilson, supra note ٦, at ١٣٣. 
in Cox v. Bruce٩, in which bales of jute were shipped with marks indicating 
the quality of the jute, the bill wrongly described the bales as bearing 
different marks indicating a better quality. The endorsees of the bill claimed 
the difference in value from the shipowner.  The Court of Appeal held that 
the shipowner was not estopped from denying the statement in the bill as to 
quality, for it was not the master's duty to insert quality marks. 
However, the statements concerning the leading marks can be inserted 
only on demand of the shipper which are required by the Hague/Visby 
Rules, Article III Rule ٣, to be in writing.  The shipper can demand such 
marks to be acknowledged by the shipowner provided that "they are stamped 
or otherwise shown clearly upon the goods …… in such a manner as should 
ordinarily remain legible until the end of the voyage"١٠. 
Hamburg Rules provide in Article ١٥ rule ١ (a) that the bill of lading 
must include inter alia ……  "(a) the general nature of the goods, the leading 
marks necessary for the identification of the goods".  It can be observed that 
Hamburg Rules, in this respect, are broadly similar to the Hague/Visby 
Rules, since the expression "general nature" may be construed similarly to 
Article III rule ٣ of the Hague/Visby Rules. The main variation between the 
two Rules, however, is that Hamburg Rules consider the statement as to 
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"leading marks" as duty of the carrier, which he is to fulfill without a 
demand by the shipper as the case with the Hague/Visby Rules. The shipper 
is merely required to furnish the particulars necessary for identification of 
the goods shipped١١.  It is worth mentioning that the Carriage of goods by 
Sea Act ١٩٥١ is typically similar to the Hague/Visty Rules, and is also the 
case with The Bill of ١٩٩٩ Section ١٧١. 
b. Statement as to quantity: 
Article III rule ٣ (b) of the Hague/Visby Rules provides that the 
shipper can demand the carrier to issue a bill showing either the number of 
packages or pieces, or quantity, or weight, as the case may be, as furnished 
in writing by the shipper.  The carrier is under no obligation to issue a bill 
presumably to acknowledge the quantity of the goods shipped, unless 
requested by the shipper, and the burden of proving such request rests with 
the shipper. The choice of which of the three methods of quantifying cargo 
to acknowledge, rests with the carrier, though presumably his choice would 
be influenced by the information supplied by the shipper.  The carrier, 
however, is not obliged to acknowledge more than one particular and can 
disavow knowledge of the other.  So in Oricon V. Intergaan١٢, two bills to 
which the Hague/Visby Rules applied acknowledged receipt of ٢٠٠٠ 
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packages and ٤٠٠٠ packages containing copra cake. A clause in them stated, 
"Contents and condition of contents, measurement, weight unknown, any 
reference to these particulars is for calculating freight only". The bill also 
stated under the heading description of the goods, said to weigh gross 
١٠٥٫٠٠٠ Kgs, and said to weigh ٢١٠٫٠٠٠ respectively.  It was held that the 
bills of lading were prima facie evidence of the number of packages shipped, 
but were no evidence whatever of their weight. 
The obligation imposed on the carrier is, however, subject to two 
provisos.  First, he is not bound to acknowledge the above facts if either he 
has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the information supplied by the 
shipper is inaccurate, or he has no reasonable means of checking it, as for 
example if the goods are delivered to him in a sealed container.  Secondly, 
the shipper in return is deemed to have guaranteed the accuracy of the 
information supplied by him, and he is required to indemnify the carrier in 
the event of the latter suffering loss as a result of its inaccuracy. 
 The position under Hamburg Rules is slightly varied. Article ١٩ (٩) 
provides "The bill of lading must include, inter alia, the following 
particulars: … The number of packages or pieces and the weight of the 
goods or their quantity otherwise expressed".  Certainly the choice of carrier 
completely depends on the kind of the goods shipped, whether it is shipped 
in bulk, packed in packages, containerized or shipped in unpacked pieces. 
As far as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ is concerned no 
difference with the Hague/Visby Rules could be observed, Article III Rule ٢ 
(c).  Similarly the Bill of ١٩٩٩ section ١٧١ (٦) is not different. 
c. Statement as to condition of the goods: 
The third type of statements required by the Hague/Visby Rules, 
Article III rule ٣ (c), to be inserted in the bill of lading is representation by 
the shipowner as to condition in which the goods were shipped.  This refers 
merely to their apparent condition in so far as the carrier, his agents or 
employees are able to judge by reasonable outward inspection.  The 
shipowner agent will normally state in the bill any damage which is  
observed during such examination and be under an obligation to deliver the 
goods at their destination in the same condition as that received, subject to 
the contractual exceptions.  If there is no clause or notation in the bill 
modifying or qualifying the statement that the goods were "shipped in good 
order and condition" the bill is a clean one.  Such an admission creates an 
estoppel as between the shipowner and an endorsee for value of the bill١٣.  
Thus in Compagnia Naviera Vas Congada V. Churchil & Sim١٤, in which 
the master had signed bills of lading for timber as "shipped in good order 
and condition to be delivered in the like order and condition".  The timber 
had before shipment become badly marked and stained by petroleum, and 
thereby commercially depreciated.  The plaintiff had become endorsees for 
the bills for value, on assumption that timber was in condition as described, 
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and they claimed from the shipowner the depreciation in value caused by the 
stained condition which must have been apparent on shipment.  It was held 
that since the shipowners had failed to deliver the timber in good order and 
condition, they were estopped from denying that it was shipped in good 
order and condition.  It must be remembered, however, that the estoppel will 
operate in respect of defects which would be apparent on reasonable 
inspection by the carrier or his agents.  Thus in Silver v. Ocean Steamship 
Co١٥, cans of frozen eggs were shipped under a bill, which stated that they 
were shipped "in apparent good order and condition".  When the cans 
arrived at port of discharge, some were found in damaged condition, being 
gashed or punctured whilst others only had pin hole perforations.  It was 
held that the shipowner were estopped as against endorsees of the bill from 
showing that the cans had gashes which have been apparent when the goods 
were loaded, but they were entitled to show that they had perforations which 
would not have been apparent on reasonable examination. 
 As already noted, under Article III rule ٣ (c) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules, the shipper is entitled to demand the issue of the bill incorporating 
statements as to apparent order and condition of the goods when received by 
the carrier.  It seems that the acknowledgement should also relate to apparent 
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capacity of the packing to survive the anticipated voyage, as well as to 
packing which was satisfactory but is damaged.  Such a bill is prima facie 
evidence of receipt of the goods if the bill has been transferred to a third 
party acting in good faith.١٦ 
 Article ١٦ rule ٣ (b) of Hamburg Rules provides “proof of the 
contrary by the carrier is not admissible if the bill of lading has been 
transferred to a third party, including a consignee, who in good faith has 
acted in reliance on description of the goods therein".  It seems as if 
Hamburg Rules revive the rule of the “detrimental reliance" in common law, 
which would invariably be present either because the shipment formed part 
of an international sale and the purchaser was induced to pay the contract 
price by presentation of the clean bill, or because the consignee of the bill 
obtained delivery of the goods by presenting the bill and paying the required 
freight.١٧  
Article ١٦ of the Rules, however, provides that if carrier has 
reasonable grounds to suspect the accuracy of the particulars concerning 
weight, number of pieces or quantity of the goods shipped, he may insert a 
reservation specifying these inaccuracies.  The same rule operates if the 
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carrier has no means to check the accuracy of the same, he has to state the 
ground of his suspicion on the bill. 
As far as the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act ١٩٥١, is concerned, it 
comes in line with the Hague Rules i.e. it provides in Article III rule ٤, that 
statement as to apparent order and condition of the goods shipped, is prima 
facie evidence of receipt by the carriers of the goods as therein described has 
already been amended by the Visby Protocol ١٩٦٨ to the effect that it deems 
the statement of apparent  good order and condition as a conclusive evidence 
when the bill has been transferred to a third party acting in good faith.  The 
Sudan courts, however, come in line with the Hague/Visby amendment.  An 
illustration is Hano Express V. Dan Fodio Benevolent Corp١٨.  In this case 
٧٨٧ packages included ٤٧٢٢ pipes had been shipped, from Jedda port to 
Port Sudan, on board the vessel "Hano Express".  A clean bill of lading had 
been issued and endorsed to the plaintiffs for value.  On delivery it appeared 
that ٩٢٥ pipes had been damaged.  The defendants, carriers, contended that 
the damage resulted from the defective packing of the cargo.  The Supreme 
Court held that the clean bill of lading is a conclusive evidence in the hands 
of endorsees regarding the good order and condition of the cargo shipped.  
So the carrier could not deny that the cargo was damaged on board. 
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Fortunately, the Draft Bill of ١٩٩٩ section ١٧٩ (٢) adopts the same 
rule as amended by the Hague/Visby Rules, regarding the conclusiveness of 
the bill of lading in the hands of  consignee or endorsee. 
ii. Obligation to provide a seaworthy ship: 
            Article III of the Rules provides. The carrier shall be bound before 
and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to: 
(a) Make the ship seaworthy. 
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship. 
(c) Make the holds; refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of 
the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage 
and reservations. 
The obligation of the carrier embraces the three distinct aspects of 
seaworthiness recognized under common law, namely the physical condition 
of the ship, the efficiency of the crew and equipment, and the seaworthiness 
of the vessel. 
  Article III requires the carrier to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy ship “before and at the beginning of the voyage.” The phrase has 
been interpreted as covering the period from at least the beginning of the 
loading until the vessel starts on her voyage. In Maxine Foot wear co ltd v. 
Canadian Government Merchant Marine١٩, the plaintiff’s cargo was lost 
when the defendants' vessel had to scuttle before it could set sail in 
contractual voyage.  After the cargo had been loaded an attempt was made, 
under the supervision of the ship’s officer, to thaw ice in three scupper holes 
by use of an oxyacetylene lamp. The cork insulation on the pipes ignited and 
the fire rapidly spread, with the result that the vessel had to be scuttled. The 
owners sought to rely on the fire exception in Article IV rule ٢ (b) under 
which they would not be responsible for the consequence of fire unless it 
resulted from “the actual fault or privity" of the owners, which it clearly did 
not in this case. It was held, however, that the loss resulted from a breach of 
the seaworthiness obligation in Article III rule ٢ (b) since the carrier’s 
obligation to exercise due diligence continued throughout the entire period 
from beginning of the loading until the ship sailed. The negligence of the 
carrier’s servants which caused the fire occurred during this period and 
constituted a failure to exercise due diligence for which the carrier was 
liable. 
Should the shipowner exercises due diligence to make his ship 
seaworthy in all respects before she sails on her voyage, he will not be liable 
under this Article if defects develop on the voyage or arise during a call at an 
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intermediate port. The term “voyage” has been construed as covering the 
entire voyage covered by the bill of lading, irrespective of calls at 
intermediate ports. The charterparty doctrine of stages, under which the 
vessel is required to be seaworthy at the commencement of each stage, does 
not apply here ٢٠. So in leesh River Tea co v. British India Steam Nav. co٢١, 
a vessel was held not to be unseaworthy within the meaning of Article III 
when cargo was damaged by the surreptitious removal of a storm valve 
cover plate by a person unknown while the vessel was calling at an 
intermediate port. 
            The undertaking of seaworthiness requires not merely that the 
shipowner will do and has done his best to make the ship fit, but that the ship 
really is fit in all respects to carry her cargo safely to its destination, having 
regard to the ordinary perils to which such a cargo would be exposed on 
such a voyage. The “ordinary perils” may include such treatment of the ship 
and cargo, as the local law of a port of call must expose to the cargo shipped. 
One test of seaworthiness is: would a prudent owner have required that the 
defect should be made good before sending his ship to sea, had he known of 
it? If he would, the ship was not seaworthy. The undertaking of 
seaworthiness involves not only that the ship is herself fit to encounter the 
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perils of the voyage, but also that she is fit to carry the cargo safely on that 
voyage. Insufficiency of the master or crew or lack of skills may constitute 
unseaworthiness, also the shipowner must provide the ship with all 
necessary documents for the voyage. The seaworthiness also comprises a 
duty to have on board suitable loading and discharging tackle for the 
ordinary purposes of loading and discharging٢٢.  
The obligation of seaworthiness under the Hague Rules was taken 
from Harter Act ١٨٩٣, and it was not an absolute one. Article III of the 
Rules requires the shipowner to exercise “due diligence" to make the ship 
seaworthy. The standard imposed by this obligation has been interpreted by 
the courts as being roughly equivalent to that of the common law duty of 
care, but with important difference that it is a personal obligation that can 
not be delegated, but if the carrier employs some other person to exercise 
due diligence and the delegate is not diligent, then the carrier is responsible, 
irrespective whether that person is a servant of the carrier, independent 
contractor, or even a Lloyd’s surveyor٢٣. 
  Professor Tetley defines the Seaworthiness as “a vessel in such a 
condition, with such equipment, and manned by such a master and crew, that 
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normally the cargo will be loaded, carried, cared for and discharged properly 
and safely on the contemplated voyage٢٤.  
The definitive interpretation of due diligence is provided by the case 
of The Muncaster Castle٢٥, in which a consignment of ox tongue had been 
shipped from Sydeny under a bill of lading which incorporated the Hague 
Rules. During the voyage the cargo was damaged by water entering the hold 
via the inspection covers on storm valve. Some months earlier, a load line 
survey of the vessel had been undertaken in Glasgow by reputable firm of 
ship repairs, during which there had been an inspection of the storm valve 
under supervision of a Lloyd`s surveyor. After the inspection had been 
completed, the task of replacing the inspection covers on the storm valve had 
been delegated to a firm employed by the ship repairers. Owing to the 
negligence on his part in tightening the nuts holding the covers, they 
loosened during the subsequent voyage allowing water to enter the hold and 
damage the cargo.  Despite the fact that there had been no negligence on the 
part of the carrier in that he had delegated the work to a reputable firm, it 
was held that the carrier was liable for breach of the obligation to exercise 
due diligence. 
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           Some difference of opinion exists as to the incidence of the burden of 
proof relating to the exercise of due diligence.  Article IV rule ١ provides 
that “the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting 
from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on his part to 
make the ship seaworthy as defined in Article III rule I. The rule then 
continues to state that whenever loss or damage has resulted from 
unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be 
on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this article. The 
general assumption to be drawn is that no onus is cast on the carrier in 
relation to proof of due diligence until the other party has first established 
that the vessel was unseaworthy and that his loss was attributable to that 
fact٢٦ . The alternative view is provided by Tetley, who argues that on policy 
the burden of proof in both cases should rest with the carrier, who is usually 
the only party to have access to the full facts. In his opinion such a 
construction is contrary to the spirit of the Rules and to the express wording 
of Article III rules I and ٢.٢٧. The case law on balance tends to favour the 
majority view. Thus in The Hellenic Dolphin,٢٨ a cargo of a asbestos was 
found, on discharge to have been damaged by sea water. It was later 
                                                 
٢٦ - Carver, supra note ١٣, at ١٠٥; Wilson, supra note ٦, at ١٩٣ – ١٩٤. 
٢٧ - Tetley, supra note ٣, at ٣٧٥ – ٣٧٦. 
٢٨ - (١٩٧٨) ٢ Lloyd’s Rep ٣٣٦. 
established that the sea water had gained access to the hold through a four 
feet long indent in the ship’s plating, of which the shipowner had been 
previously unaware. No evidence was available as to whether damage to the 
vessel had been inflicted before or after the cargo had been loaded.  In this 
circumstances the trial judge allowed the shipowner to rely on the exception 
of perils of the sea since, in his opinion and in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the type of damage involved was a classic example of damage 
caused by a peril of the sea.  
The shipowner would only be prevented from relying on the exception 
if the shipper could prove that the loss resulted from the vessel being 
unseaworthy “before and at the beginning of the voyage". 
  As far as Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ is concerned it has a 
similar provision to the Hague’s in Article III, as well as The Draft Bill of 
١٩٩٩ in Section ١٨٥.  The burden of proof is provided for in Article IV rule 
I of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١.  
iii- Obligation of care of cargo:  
The third duty imposed on the carrier by the Hague/Visby Rules 
relates to the care of cargo. Article III rule ٢ provides that: “Subject to the 
provisions of Article ١V, carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, 
stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods delivered".  
  This Article has been construed as requiring from the carrier the 
exercise of a standard roughly equivalent to that of reasonable care. So much 
is apparent from the inclusion of the word “carefully" in the definition, but the 
addition of “properly" raises the question as to whether the draftsmen of the 
Rules intended a higher duty of care. The point was considered by the House 
of Lords in Albacora v. Westcott and Laurence line٢٩, a case in which a 
consignment of wet salted fish had been shipped at Glasgow for Genoa. The 
crates were marked “keep away from engines and boilers”, but otherwise no 
special instructions for carriage were given by the shippers.  It was 
subsequently established that fish of this type could not be safely carried on 
such voyage without refrigeration, although this fact was unknown to the 
carrier. On arrival at Genoa the cargo was found to have deteriorated 
substantially in quality as a result of bacterial action and the question was 
whether it had been carried “properly" within the meaning of Article III. In 
answering this question in the affirmative, the court expressed the view that 
properly meant in accordance with a sound system in the light of all 
knowledge, which the carrier has or ought to have about the nature of the 
goods.  It was held that the respondents did adopt a sound system.  They had 
no reason to suppose that the goods required any different treatment from that 
                                                 
٢٩ - (١٩٦٦) ٢ Lloyd’s Rep ٥٣. 
which the goods received.  So in absence of any breach of duty under this 
Article, the carrier was accordingly allowed to rely on the defense of inherent 
vice.  
The wording of Article III rule ٢ implies a continuous obligation on 
the carrier running from “tackle" to “tackle" i.e. from the commencement of 
the loading to the completion of discharging, it is a strict obligation and 
nothing in the Rules referring to due diligence to care for cargo.  It will be 
noted that the duty of care required to be exercised by the carrier is 
expressly made subject to the provisions of Article IV. This reference to the 
catalogue of exceptions listed in Article IV rule ٢ that can be raised as a 
defense to the carrier. Once the cargo owner has proved that the goods have 
been lost or damaged in transit, the onus shifts to the carrier to bring the 
cause of damage within one of the exceptions listed in Article IV rule ٢ (a) 
– (p)٣٠ . 
            The Carriage By Sea Act ١٩٥١ imposes a typical obligation on the 
carrier as provided for in Article III rule (٢) as well as The Draft Bill of 
١٩٩٩, in section ١٨٥ (٢). 
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٣- The Hague/Visby Exceptions:  
The earlier bills of lading did not contain any exceptions at all. The 
first provision of this kind was “the danger of the sea only excepted". The 
list of exceptions were enlarged, Scrutton enumerated about sixty clauses, 
which exempt carrier from liability٣١.     
  Article IV rule ٢ of the Hague/Visby Rules lists seventeen exceptions. 
The carrier is permitted to surrender the protection afforded by these 
exceptions in whole or in part٣٢, but he is not allowed to add to this list. 
i- Fault in navigation or management of the ship: 
        This exception covers errors in navigation or in the management of a 
ship, nautical fault, has a long history dated back to the nineteenth century. It 
was frequently incorporated into bills of lading long before the advent of the 
Hague and Hague/Visby Rules. In its basic form, designed merely to provide 
protection for errors of navigation, the exception is inapplicable once 
negligence on the part of the carrier is established. However it is more 
commonly drafted to cover situations in which negligence is involved. The 
modern version first appeared in statutory form in section ٣ of the United 
States Harter Act ١٨٩٣. The exception covers fault in both the navigation 
and management of the ship. Little difficulty has been experienced in 
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interpreting the phrase “faults of navigation”. Thus it has been to cover 
cargo damage where due to the negligence of the master or crew, the vessel 
struck a reef, ran aground or collided with another vessel. Tetley’s view is 
that error in navigation and management of the ship is an erroneous act or 
omission the original purpose of which was primarily directed towards the 
ship, her safety and well- being, or towards the venture generally.٣٣ Many 
problems have been encountered in seeking to distinguish fault in the 
management of the ship, which falls within the exception, from the carrier’s 
duty under Art III rule ٢ to take proper care of the cargo. Each case must be 
decided on its own facts, but uncertainty has arisen because the same 
negligent act frequently affects both the safety of the vessel and the safety of 
the cargo. In such circumstances the courts tend to have regard to the 
property primarily affected by the conduct in question. Thus negligent 
stowage, or the failure properly to secure the cargo during discharge, is 
conduct primarily directed towards cargo care and any resultant damage is 
not covered by the exception٣٤. Similarly, in Gosse Millerd v. Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine٣٥, a vessel had to go into dock for repairs and 
the hatches were left open to provide ease of access. Owing to failure to 
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replace the tarpaulins, rainwater penetrated the hold and damaged the cargo 
of tinplate. In view of the House of Lords, as the tarpaulins were provided to 
protect the cargo, the conduct in question related to the care of cargo rather 
than management of the ship. 
        Conversely, where the primary objective is the safety of the vessel, it is 
immaterial for this purpose that the negligent conduct also affects cargo. So 
in the Canadian case of Kalamazoo Paper co v. Cpr Co٣٦, a vessel was 
seriously damaged after hitting a rock and was beached in order to prevent 
her sinking. The cargo owners claimed for cargo damage alleging 
negligence on the part of master and crew in failing to use all available 
pumping facilities in order to keep the water level down after the vessel had 
grounded. The Supreme Court of Canada held that, in the circumstances, the 
use of the pumping machinery affected the general safety of the ship and 
consequently the actions of the crew fell within the management of the ship 
exception.   
This exception has been the target of considerable criticism from 
cargo interests, as it affords a protection to sea carrier which is not available 
in any other transport convention. Moreover, the modern technology makes 
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it easy to eliminate errors in navigation, and to control the ship by the owner 
whenever it is.  
  ii- Fire: 
        The Hague/Visby exception relating to fire excludes the carrier from 
responsibility for loss or damage arising or resulting from fire “unless 
caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier". Consequently, while a 
carrier is not liable for fire damage resulting from the negligent conduct of 
his servants or agents, for whose acts he would otherwise be vicariously 
liable, he will loose the protection of the exception where he is personally at 
fault. The presence or absence of such a fault is a question of fact to be 
decided on the circumstances of each case٣٧. As an example reference may 
be made to Lennard`s Carrying Co. ltd v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. ltd.٣٨  A 
ship was sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, and as a result she stranded and 
her cargo was destroyed by fire. The vessel belonged to a limited company 
of which Lennard was a director. His name was registered in the ship’s 
register, and he took an active part in her management. It was held that 
Lennard was an agent of the company and not merely a servant. There was a 
presumption that his action was the action of the company itself. The 
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company could not therefore exclude its liability for loss by fire, for it had 
not been shown that the loss had occurred without its actual fault or privity. 
    
The carrier in order to exculpate himself under Article IV rule ٢ (b), 
first must prove the cause of the loss i.e. that fire caused the loss. In proving 
that fire caused the loss, it should be noted that fire means a flame and not 
merely heat. After proving the cause the carrier must show that he exercised 
due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage to make the vessel 
seaworthy in respect of the loss. The burden of proving the cause of the loss 
and due diligence is on the carrier. It is not clear from the Rules who then 
has the burden of proving the fault or privity of the carrier, but the United 
States jurisprudence based on the U.S Fire Statute section.(١٨٢ ٤٦ US Code) 
places the burden of proof on the cargo claimant٣٩. 
iii- Perils of the Sea, and similar exceptions, force majeure: 
    It covers any damage to cargo caused by risks peculiar to the sea, or to the 
navigation of a ship at sea, which cannot be avoided by the exercise of 
reasonable care. Thus it extends to loss resulting from vessels running 
aground in fog, being driven onto rocks in a gale, or even colliding with 
other vessels, provided that the owner of the vessel carrying the cargo was 
not at fault. Thus in Wilson Sons & Co V The Owners of the cargo, the 
Xantho,٤٠ a bill of lading containing an exception of “perils of the sea" had 
been issued.  The vessel on which the cargo had been loaded came into 
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collision with another ship, and damage to the goods resulted. It was held 
that the collision was a “peril of the sea” within the meaning of the 
exception. On the other hand the exception refers only to perils of the sea 
and not perils which could equally be encountered on land or on any other 
form of transport. Accordingly, unlike “act of God”٤١ it does not extend to 
damage caused by rain, lighting or fire or to loss resulting from rats or 
cockroaches contaminating the cargo٤٢. The exception can also be invoked 
to cover consequential loss arising from action taken to counteract a peril of 
the sea, as in the Canadian case of Canada Rice Mills V. union Marine Ins٤٣.  
A cargo of rice suffered heat damage as the result of periodic closing of 
ventilators and hatches during the voyage to prevent the incursion of sea 
water during a storm. It was held that the damage can be regarded as the 
direct result of the peril.   
Generally the question of peril of the sea is bound up with due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy for the voyage in question,٤٤ i.e. that 
the test of seaworthiness is whether the ship is reasonably fit to carry the 
cargo, which she has undertaken to transport, considering the season and 
waters to be traversed.  For example, hatches must be especially tightly 
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secured and cargo carefully stowed for a voyage.  If hatches leak or cargo 
breaks loose one can conclude that the vessel was not seaworthy and there 
was no peril, and the burden of proving a peril of the sea is on the carrier. He 
can introduce the “log book” of the vessel to prove heavy wind for instance.  
The Hague/Visby Rules have a number of exceptions similar to perils 
of the sea; in fact, they are, in effect perils of the sea. They are act of God 
Article IV rule ٢ (d) ; act of war, Article IV rule ٢ (e); act of public enemies 
Article IV rule ٢ (f) ; act or restraint of princes, rulers or people, or seizure 
under legal process, Article IV rule (٢) (g) Quarantine restrictions, Article 
IV rule ٢ (h); strikes or lock – outs or stoppage or restraint of  labour from 
whatever cause, whether partial or general, Article IV rule ٢ (f); riots and 
civil commotions, Article IV rule ٢ (k); saving or attempting to save life or 
property at sea, Article IV rule ٢ (l). These similar exceptions follow the 
same rules of proof as perils of the sea.  They are frequently joined together 
under the general exception “force majeure”.  Most of the similar exceptions 
are self – explanatory, for example, war, riots and quarantine.   
a- Act of God:  
  This exception can only be invoked where the damage or loss is solely 
attributable to natural causes independent of any human intervention, and 
that it could not have been prevented by any amount of foresight, pains and 
care, reasonably to be expected from him. Thus the damage caused by 
storm, frost, lightning or high wind would fall within this exception even 
though they may be relatively common occurrences٤٥. An example of a case 
of act of God “exception” is Nugent v. Smith٤٦, in which a common carrier, 
took on board a mare of E`s .No bill of lading was signed. Partly by more 
than ordinarily bad weather, partly by the conduct of the mare, without any 
negligence by the crew, the mare was seriously injured. It was held that the 
shipowner was not liable for injuries resulting from these concurrent causes, 
which he could not by reasonable care and foresight have prevented, and 
was accordingly protected by the exception of act of God. In Siordet v. 
Hall٤٧, it was held that the exception did not cover the act of negligence by 
the master. In this case the goods were shipped under a bill of lading 
excepting the “act of God”. The vessel having to start next morning, the 
captain filled his boiler overnight, and frost came on, the tubes burst, 
damaging the goods. 
b- Act of war and act of “public enemies”: 
The exception “act of public enemies” provided for in Article IV rule 
٢ (f), is designed to cover acts committed by states, or their subjects, with 
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whom the sovereign is at war.  It bears the same meaning of the common 
law exception of the Queen's enemies and it is traditionally justified on the 
ground that otherwise the carrier would have no recourse since the parties 
involved are outside the jurisdiction of the national courts. Thus in Russell 
V. Niemann٤٨, in which F, merchants in Russia, shipped wheat on a ship 
belonging to A, a subject of the Duke of Mecklenburg, to England under a 
bill of lading containing an exception “The Kings enemies”. The Duke was 
at war with Denmark and the ship was captured by the Danes. It was held 
that the exception certainly included enemies of the ship owner’s sovereign, 
and the shipowner was therefore freed. The exception also extends to 
reasonable steps taken by the carrier to avoid an imminent threat of such 
action as, for example, deviation into a neutral port to avoid capture.  The 
meaning of the exception “act of war” provided for in Article IV rule ٢ (e),is 
not clear, but presumably the two phrases together i.e. act of “public 
enemies” and “act of war” cover the action of any belligerent and of pirates 
also٤٩. 
c- Arrest or restraints of princes, rulers or seizure under legal 
process:  
                                                 
٤٨ - (١٨٦٤) ١٧ CB ١٦٣. 
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    It covers any active and forcible intervention by a government or state 
authority in time of peace, which prevents or interferes with performance of 
the carrier's obligations under a contract of carriage. It includes restrictions 
on trade, embargoes, blockade or application of customs, quarantine 
regulations, confiscations of goods as contraband and so forth٥٠. Thus in 
Miller V. Law Accidents Insurance Co٥١, the claim was under a policy on 
cattle from Liverpool to Buenos Aires. When the cattle were shipped, a 
decree was in force at Buenos Aires forbidding the entry of animals 
suffering from contagious diseases or coming from countries where such 
diseases prevailed. The cattle were inspected on arrival by Argentine 
officials, and were found to be diseased.  On the following day the ministry 
issued a general order forbidding the discharge of any cattle arriving from 
the United Kingdom. The ship therefore left the dock at Buenos Aires with 
the cattle, and they were transshipped outside the port, and landed at 
Montevideo.  It was held that the loss of the voyage to Buenos Aires was by 
“restraints of people".   
Conversely, the exception does not operate when facts known to the 
ship owners existed before the beginning of the voyage, which showed that 
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the ship was inevitably doomed to become subject to restraint, which was 
not an exceptional but arose by reason of the general law of the country in 
question. In Ciampa V. British India steam Nav. Co٥٢ a cargo of lemons 
loaded at Naples for London was severely damaged while being subjected to 
process of eradication in Marseilles as required by a decree of French 
government. The shipowners were aware that such action was likely to be 
taken as the vessel had a foul bill of health having originally sailed from a 
plague- ridden port. It was held that the damage was not caused by “restraint 
of princes”  
          The phrase “seizure under legal process” in Article IV rule ٢ (g) 
covers the ordinary judicial process i.e. when goods were detained as a result 
of civil action٥٣. The only one restriction on the scope of the exception that it 
applies purely to judicial proceeding and to acts of state authorities and not 
to non- governmental bodies such as mobs, rebels or guerrillas.   
d- Quarantine restrictions: 
   This exception refers normally to restriction put on a ship not to 
discharge goods, crew or passengers for a specific period of time, normally 
forty days, because of spread of epidemic diseases in the port of loading or 
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see Carver, supra note ١٣, at ١٥٢.   
in intermediate port at which the vessel has call.  This exception is unlikely 
to have much significance.٥٤ 
e- Strikes or lockouts: 
  This exception is provided for in Article IV rule ٢ (i) from the Hague 
/Visby Rules. Strike has been defined in the law as “a general concerted 
refusal by workmen to work in consequence of an alleged grievance”٥٥. 
Since that time it has been more broadly interpreted to extend to a 
sympathetic strike where the workers involved have no personal grievance 
with their employers, and to a case where the refusal to work a night shift 
involved no breach of contract on the part of work force. 
On the other hand the withdrawal of labour must retain some 
connection, however tenuous, with an industrial dispute and consequently 
the exception has been held to cover a stoppage of work by miners through 
fear of cholera, or the refusal of crew to sail because of the possibility of 
attack by enemy submarines٥٦. An attempt to reconcile these cases and 
produce an all-embracing modern definition was made by Lord Denning M 
R in New Horizon٥٧, in which a strike is defined as “a concerted stoppage of 
work by men done with a view to improving their wages or condition or 
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giving vent to a grievances, or making a protest about something or other, or 
supporting or sympathizing with other workmen in such endeavor. It is 
distinct from a stoppage, which is brought about by an external event or by 
apprehension of danger".  
 The exception covers not only loss caused directly by the strike itself, 
but also consequential loss resulting from the after effect of the stoppage. So 
the charterers in Lenis v. Bank (No٢)٥٨, could rely on the exception where 
loading had been delayed owing to congestion following a strike which had 
been settled before the chartered vessel reaching the loading port.  
f- Riots and civil commotions: 
  Riots refer to riots in the strict sense of the criminal law, and “civil 
commotions” have been defined in reference to insurance policies, as “an 
insurrection of the people for general purposes, though it may not amount to 
a rebellion.  It does not cover an organized conspiracy to commit criminal 
acts, such as suffragette activities, without any actual commotion or 
disturbance٥٩. The phrase is used to indicate a stage between a riot and a 
civil war, but civil commotions may, technically, be a riot. The carrier will 
only be protected by this exception if the disturbance actually causes the loss 
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or damage in question٦٠.  In The Village Belle,٦١ the exception included 
“civil commotion, strikes, riots, and stoppage of train ….. etc”. The port of 
loading was Bilbao, and that place was at the time threatened by Carlist 
forces which cut the railway for some days.  It was held that to excuse the 
charterer for delay in the loading, it was not sufficient to show a general civil 
disturbance, and a stoppage of the railway for a short period.  It must be 
shown that there was a disturbing cause of such a character as to prevent and 
that it did actually prevent, the loading. Although the aforesaid case 
discussed facts relating to charterparty, the exception of “riots and civil 
commotions" has the same effect in the carriage covered by a bill of lading. 
g- Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea:  
            This exception is self-explanatory. It covers any measures taken by 
the master to save lives or property at sea. The exception covers cases in 
which the ship deviates to save life or property at sea, to be excused as 
ustifiable deviation. So the well-known doctrine of deviation٦٢ does not 
operate to hold such an act as fundamental breach of contract on the part of 
the carrier, but the liberty to deviate to save life or property has been held 
not to extend beyond the necessity of the particular case.  In an American 
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case, The Emily٦٣, a steamer carrying cargo from San Francisco Coos Bay 
found another steamer on the rocks, and having towed her off, took her in to 
a harbour, where she was pumped out, and lay safe, but in a position which 
might become dangerous. Tugs were there which could tow her into San 
Francisco, but the salving steamer took her to that port. It was held that it 
was unjustifiable deviation. 
iv- Inherent defect:                  
This exception is provided for in Article IV Rule ٢ (m) of the Hague 
/Visby Rules, to the effect that the carrier is not liable for loss or damage 
which results exclusively from some inherent quality of the cargo carried.  
  Tetley draws attention that the English translation omits the phrase 
“hidden defects” which means defects not from the nature of the cargo, and 
which cannot be discovered by the carrier or his servants on shipment٦٤. The 
exception is most frequently invoked in the case of perishable goods such as 
fruit or fish which in the normal course of events are likely to deteriorate in 
quality during transit.  It also covers the inevitable wastage associated with 
the carriage of bulk cargo such as oil or grain, provided that such reduction 
in volume falls within the customary tolerance recognized in the trade .Also 
certain liquids are known to ferment during carriage, while metal goods are 
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capable of rust damage٦٥. Thus in Albacora v. Westcott & Laurence line 
ltd٦٦ where a consignment of wet salted fish is shipped at Glasgow for 
Genoa, the carrier was not held liable for the deterioration in quality of 
goods during transit since he had not been told by the shipper that the fish 
required refrigeration .He was allowed successfully to rely on the exception 
of inherent vice.  
   Also in East West Produce co v. SS. Nordnees,٦٧ onions were held to 
be unfit for a long voyage at the end of the season through tropical climates 
from Melbourne to Vancouver. The carrier proved proper stowage and care. 
The fact that damage to goods arises out of their inherent nature, 
however, constitutes no defence to the carrier if it is aggravated by the 
carrier negligence. When a clean bill of lading has been issued estoppel 
usually arises, or in other words the carrier is usually prevented from 
proving, as against a third party relying on the clean bill of lading, that there 
was any defect. However in the case of inherent defect, the carrier is not 
estopped by his clean bill of lading. 
v- Acts and faults of the shipper:  
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  In considering the exception of acts and faults of the shipper a 
distinction should be drawn between acts which invoke the exception and 
free the carrier from any liability and others which give the carrier specific 
rights against the shipper. The Hague Rules include provisions dealing with 
cases in which the carrier is responsible to third parties consignees to any 
damage or loss of cargo. He has the right of recourse against the shipper if 
the damage in question was caused by acts or omissions of the shipper٦٨. 
Again, this exception does not deal with the fault of the shipper in cases of 
shipment of dangerous cargoes. The Rules include separate proviso in this 
matter in Article IV rule ٦. Specific examples of this general exception 
contained respectively in Article IV rule ٢ (n) i.e. insufficiency of packing 
and (o) inadequacy of marks.                                                                  
                                                 
٦٨ - As in the case of inaccurate particulars describing marks, number quantity or weigh 
furnished by the shipper to be stated in the bill provided for in Art III r ٥. 
 a- Insufficiency of packing: 
   Sufficient packing is normal packing or customary packing in the 
trade. Such packing invariably prevents all but the most minor damage under 
normal conditions of care.  Some objects are normally tied in bundles 
without other packing, while other objects such as automobiles are not 
packed at all. Nevertheless what is customary is sufficient packing.٦٩ Thus in 
the American case of The Silversandal,٧٠ a consignment of rubber has been 
crashed in transit, the carrier invoked the exception of insufficient packing.  
It was held that rubber could have been packed to avoid all crushing 
damage, but this would have been too expensive and thus prohibitive. The 
bales of rubber also could have been stowed in a particular manner to avoid 
all crushing, but this could have been too expensive for the carrier. The court 
found both the stowage and packing customary and relieved the carrier. 
  Many cases of insufficiency of packing will be obvious on shipment.  
It is advisable for carrier to note the precise details on the bill of lading, but 
if the carrier issued a clean bill of lading, he is subsequently estopped from 
raising the exception of insufficient or defective packing. So in Silver v. 
Ocean Steamship Corp٧١, clean bills were issued in respect of consignment 
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of frozen Chinese eggs, which were shipped in ٤٢ ١٦ tins, loaded on trays of 
٨٤ tins each, without being protected by any form of packing. When many 
tins arrived at their destination severely damaged, the carrier was estopped 
from invoking the exception against a consignee who had relied in good 
faith on the clean bills. 
b- Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks: 
          This exception refers to marks and markings on cargo being so 
unclear or insufficient that cargo is lost, mixed, misdelivered or damaged. 
Loss or damage caused by inaccuracy of marks is not covered by this 
exception. The burden is on the carrier to show that marks were 
insufficient٧٢. Thus in Sandeman & Sons v. Tyzack and Branfoot Steamship 
Co ltd٧٣, a consignee of bales of jute claimed that six of his bales were 
missing. It was found that ١٤ bales belonging either to that consignee or to 
others were missing and that ١١ bales were available without any marks. 
Upon failure of the carrier to invoke the exception of insufficient marking, it 
was held that the consignee was entitled to claim for his six bales not 
delivered, and was not obliged to accept that any of the unmarked bales 
belonged to him.   
 vi- Latent defects:  
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Article IV rule ٢ (p) of The Hague/Visby Rules provides “Neither the 
carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from latent defects not discoverable by due diligence”. This 
exception known as latent defects refers only to defects in ship and not in 
cargo.  According to Carver٧٤, “A defect is said to be latent when it can not 
be discovered by person of competent skill using ordinary care. A defect is 
not latent if it is discoverable by reasonable methods”. Accordingly one can 
gather that the words” not discoverable by due diligence” in this exception 
add nothing to the expression latent defects”.  As in The Falls city,٧٥ in 
which a vessel was dry-docked and appeared to be scaling. The hull was 
actually cracked and was painted with a long handled paintbrush ٢٠ feet 
long. A surveyor said there was no scaling and no crack, but he walked 
around down below.  It was held that this was not a latent defect. 
vii- The catch- all exception: 
Article IV rule ٢ (g) of the Hague/Visby Rules provides “Neither the 
carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from, 
any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or 
without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the 
burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to 
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show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or 
neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or 
damage”. The effect of this general exculpatory provision that the carrier can 
avoid liability for any damage or loss not falling within the named exception 
provided that he can establish that it occurred without his own fault or٧٦ 
privity and it did not result from any fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, 
his servants and agents. An independent contractor such as stevedores 
engaged by the carrier is regarded as servant or agent of the carrier in this 
context. An example of a carrier successfully discharging this burden of proof 
is provided by Goodwin, Ferreira &co V. Lamport &Holt,٧٧ where a crate, 
being lowered into lighter, broke open and its contents fell out damaging bales 
of cotton yarn already stowed in the lighter. The carrier avoided liability by 
establishing that the lid of the crate had been insecurely fastened on shipment 
and that the incident had involved no lack of care on the part of his servants or 
agents. 
              If cause of the loss is inexplicable, it is impossible for the carrier to 
prove that his fault had not contributed to the loss or damage. Problems have 
also arisen with regard to the applicability of the exceptions to cases of 
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pilferage and theft. The carrier could not invoke the exception under Article 
IV rule ٢ (q) where there had been theft of cargo by the carriers servants or 
even by employees of a firm of stevedores engaged by the carrier to 
discharge the cargo. The courts draw a distinction between thefts committed 
in the course of employment and thefts which had no connection with the 
work the independent contractors were engaged to perform.٧٨  Thus in Leesh 
River Tea Co V. British India SN Co,٧٩ where damage to cargo resulted 
from the theft of a storm valve cover by stevedores employed by the carrier 
to discharge a cargo of tea at Port Sudan. The carrier satisfied the court that 
the theft had involved no negligence on the part of the ship’s officers and 
crew, but the question still remained as to whether he had to take 
responsibility for the acts of stevedores who, admittedly, were independent 
contractors.  It was held that there was a distinction between thefts 
committed in the course of employment i.e. thefts of cargo, and thefts which 
had no connection with the work of the independent contractors were 
engaged to perform. Accordingly the carrier is allowed to exclude liability 
relying on the exception provided for in rule ٢ (q) to defeat the cargo owners 
claim. 
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  Concerning the exceptions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
١٩٥١ and The Draft Bill of ١٩٩٩, no difference can be observed between the 
١٩٥١ Act and the Hague/Visby Rules exceptions as duly explained, Article 
IV (Rights and Immunities rule ٢ provides for the same seventeen 
exceptions of the Hague/Visby Rules.  
         As far as the Bill of ١٩٩٩ is concerned, although it incorporates the 
Hague/Visby Rules,٨٠ but it is inconsistent with the Rules in two respects: 
first, it includes nineteen exceptions instead of seventeen. This is not 
permitted by the Rules, under which the carrier may surrender any of his 
immunities and to increase his liabilities, but he is not allowed to diminish 
his responsibilities٨١. Secondly, the Bill in section ١٨٧ (١) (a) excludes 
liability of the carrier in case of unseaworthiness of the ship beyond the 
standard provided for in section ١٨٥. This is contrary to the basis of liability 
under the Rules by which the carrier is bound to provide a sea worthy ship at 
the beginning of the voyage.  In cases of loss or damage to cargo, the burden 
is on him to prove that the ship is seaworthy. If he failed to discharge the 
burden, he is deprived from invoking any exception included in the bill of 
lading, which means that the unseaworthy is regarded as a fundamental 
breach which operates as a bar to the exceptions. So to include such a 
                                                 
٨٠ - S. ١٦٩.                                  
٨١ - Art. (v) of the  Hague/Visby Rules.  
provision under the exceptions is confusing and unnecessary. Moreover, the 
Bill includes under section. ١٨٧ (١) the exception of “criminal act" instead 
of “act of public enemies” provided for in Article IV rule ٢ (f) of the Rules.  
As we mention, that it is not allowed to add to the list of the exceptions 
under the Rules. So the “criminal acts” either to be categories as “act of 
public enemies” or may be exempted by the catch all exception in Article IV 
rule ٢ (q),٨٢ in cases of theft or pilferage done by the servants of the carrier. 
If the “criminal acts” in the Bill are construed to mean piracy or robbery, 
those acts exempted namely under the common law before the advent of the 
Hague Rules.  The Rules exculpate such acts, in cases which are regarded as 
perils of the sea only.٨٣  
Finally the Bill exculpates the carrier from liability for saving or 
attempting to save life or property at sea in section. ١٨٧ ١ (p) similar to 
Article IV rule ٢ (٤), but it provides repeatedly in section ١٨٧ ١ (r) to 
exclude any deviations for saving or attempting to save life or property at 
sea or deviation for any other reasonable cause”.  
This subsection refers to the liability of the carrier under the doctrine 
of deviation.  It is contrary to the Hague/Visby Rules to be included as an 
exception.  It can be provided for separately. 
                                                 
٨٢ - See p ٤٠ supra. 
٨٣ - See p ٥٧ supra; scrutton, supra note ١٧, at ٢٣٠.  
٤- Basis of liability Under Hamburg Rules:   
In framing uniform and comprehensive test of carrier liability, the 
draftsmen of Hamburg Rules have adopted the argument long advanced by 
cargo interests that the carrier liability should be based exclusively on fault 
and that a carrier should be responsible without exception for all loss of, and 
damage, to cargo that results from his own fault or the fault of his servants 
or agents. This statement of basic liability is drafted in Article ٤ (١) in the 
following terms: “The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or 
damage to the goods as well as for delay in delivery, if the occurrence which 
caused the loss, damage, or delay took place while the goods were in his 
charge as defined in Article ٤, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants 
or agents, took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
occurrence of its consequences”. 
The draftsmen of Hamburg Rules were seeking to overcome some of 
the inconsistencies arising from the ambiguous wording in the Hague/Visby 
Rules. Under the latter, the obligation of the carrier to provide a seaworthy 
ship was limited to a duty to exercise “due diligence" while he was required 
to look “properly and carefully after the cargo throughout the carriage". 
Thus Hamburg Rules introduce uniform test of liability based on fault.  
Unfournately the search for the uniformity of construction is not assisted by 
the introduction of variations in phraseology such as occur later in Article ٥ 
when reference is made to “fault or neglect"  of the carrier rather than to “all 
measures that could reasonably be required” which raises an identical 
question of duty of care intended in both cases. Further confusion is caused 
by the annexing to the convention a common understanding “that the 
liability of the carrier under the convention is based on the principle of 
“presumed fault or neglect”٨٤. 
  Further attempt to achieve uniformity and simplicity that the Hamburg 
Rules adopt a unified burden of proof rests on the carrier. The justification is 
to place the burden of proof on the party most likely to have knowledge of 
the facts. Only in the case of damage caused by fire is the burden shifted 
away from the carrier, presumably for the reason that it is difficult to 
establish the precise origin of a fire at sea that in the majority of cases it 
tends to originate with the cargo٨٥.  
  Finally, the fact that the Hamburg Rules, being in force only on 
١/November of ١٩٩٢, and that it has not been ratified by any major maritime 
nations such as the United Kingdom, makes its uniform test of liability need 
more time to be tested and verified on practical basis.     
٥- Conclusion: 
                                                 
٨٤ - Wilson, supra note ٦, at ٢١٤ – ٢١٦.   
٨٥ - Art. ٥ (٤). 
 The Hague/Visby Rules define the "carrier" as including the owner or 
the charterer who enters into contract of carriage with a shipper.  While 
Hamburg Rules define the "carrier" as any person by whom or in whose 
name contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a 
shipper.  This definition may include the shipowner, charterer or agent of the 
shipowner.  Thus the definition of "carrier" under Hamburg Rules is wider 
than that of the Hague/Visby Rules. 
The Hague/Visby scheme of liability is built on specific obligations 
by which the carrier is bound i.e. the obligation to issue a bill of lading, on 
demand of the shipper with certain particulars, the obligation of exercising 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship before and at the beginning of the 
voyage and the obligation of care of cargo i.e. properly and carefully load, 
handle, stow, carry, keep and discharge the goods.  These obligations are 
subjected to seventeen exceptions by virtue of which the carrier is 
completely exempted from liability for loss or damage to cargo.  The 
relatively long list of exceptions has encouraged many critiques, most of 
them focused on that some of them are ambiguous and interrelated and 
others are obsolete for example “the nautical fault" exception.  Hamburg 
Rules introduce a new scheme of liability based on the "presumed fault", 
that whenever there is loss or damage to cargo, the carrier is presumed to be 
at fault except if he reputed the burden by proving that the loss or damage to 
cargo is not resultant from his fault or privity of him or his agents or 
employees, but the Rules exempt the case of fire from this presumption.  
 Many authorities regard this scheme of liability as easier and more 
just to the cargo interests.  
Chapter Two 
Scope of liability of the Sea Carrier 
 
 
In this chapter I will pinpoint the scope of liability of the sea carrier. 
Hence, the issues of documents and types of carriage covered by both 
Hague/Visby and Hamburg Rules will be outlined.  Also period of 
responsibility under both conventions will be considered. Finally provisions 
which consider the responsibility of the carrier in particular cases will be 
focused, compared and contrasted in both conventions.  
١-Types of Carriage Covered by the Rules: 
i- Under The Hague/Visby Rules: 
The basic formula for application of the Rules focuses on the 
document covering the carriage contract rather than on the contract of 
carriage itself.  Thus Article ١ (b) states that the Rules are applicable “only 
to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar document 
of title in so far as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea". 
From the above it would appear that the Rules are not designed to 
cover contracts of carriage which envisage the issue of waybill or other non-
negotiable document i.e. straight bill, since these do not constitute 
documents of title.  Nor would the Rules apply to charterparties, or even 
bills of lading issued under charterparty, at least so long as such bills remain 
in the hands of the charterer.  Once the bill is assigned to a third party, the 
position will change and the Rules will operate from the moment at which 
such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates the relations 
between a carrier and a holder of the same. 
On the other hand, the English courts construe Article ١ (b) of the 
Rules, to take effect in cases when the parties envisage that the contract of 
carriage will be covered by a bill of lading, even though, in the event no 
such document is in fact issued.  This was established in Pyrene Co ltd V. 
Scandia Navigation Co٨٦, where a consignment of fire tenders had been 
delivered alongside the vessel for shipment.  While one of the tenders was 
being lifted aboard by the ship's tackle it fell back onto the dockside and was 
seriously damaged.  The remaining tenders were loaded safely and the bill of 
lading which was eventually issued made no reference to the damaged 
tender.  When the carrier sought to limit his liability under Article ١V rule ٥ 
of The Hague Rules, the shipper argued that he was unable to do so because 
the carriage of the damaged tender was not "covered by a bill of lading".  It 
was held that the important factor was whether the parties, in contracting, 
                                                 
٨٦ - (١٩٥٤) ٢ QB ٤٠٢; cited in Ivamy, Case Book on Carriage by Sea, ٥٧ (٢nd ed ١٩٧١). 
envisaged the issue of a bill of lading and not whether one was in fact 
actually issued. 
As far as the geographical scope of application is concerned, Article X 
of the Rules provides that "The provisions of these Rules shall apply to 
every bill of lading relating to the carriage of goods between ports in two 
different states if: 
a. The bill of lading issued in a contracting state, or. 
b. The carriage is from a port in a contracting state, or. 
c. The contract contained or evidenced by the bill of lading provides that 
these Rules or legislation of any state giving effect to them are 
governing the contract, whatever may be the nationality of the ship, 
the carrier, the shipper, the consignee, or any other interested person". 
The wording of Article x clearly envisages an international contract of 
carriage "between ports in different states".  Two of the situations specified 
in Article x satisfy the basic requirement that a bill of lading be issued, 
namely, where the bill is issued in a contracting state and also where the bill 
expressly incorporates the Rules, irrespective of the geographical location of 
the port of loading in either case.  The third alternative refers simply to 
carriage from a port in a contracting state.  The position under the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ is similar. It provides in Section ٢: "subject to the 
provisions of this Act, the rules set out in the schedule hereto shall have 
effect in relation to and in connection with the carriage of goods by sea in 
ships carrying goods from any port in the Sudan to any other port whether in 
or outside Sudan".  It is clear from the above quotation that the Act covers 
the outward carriage of goods only.  Hence the inward carriage is outside the 
scope of application of the Act. It is mainly governed by the provisions of 
the bill of lading which are widely varied according to the convention 
prevailing in the state of loading, and the state of issuing the bill of lading in 
the first place. 
Unsuccessfully, the Draft Bill of ١٩٩٩ omits to provide for the scope 
of its application, but since it adopts the Hague/Visby Rules according to 
section ١٦٩, it can be inferred that it covers, similar to its predecessors, the 
outward carriage of goods by sea only. 
ii- Under Hamburg Rules: 
The Hamburg Rules are to apply, according to Article ١ (b), to 
contracts of carriage by sea which are defined as "any contract whereby the 
carrier undertakes against payment of freight to carry goods by sea from one 
port to another".  Where the contract envisages some form of multimodal 
carriage, the application of the Rules will be restricted to the sea leg. This 
approach differs from that of either the Hague or the Hague/Visby Rules 
which concentrate on "contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or 
any similar document of title". So far as the Hamburg Rules are concerned, 
it is immaterial whether a bill of lading or a non-negotiable receipt is issued, 
and the definition of "bill of lading" in Article ١ (٧) is worded accordingly. 
The new convention, however, follows its predecessors in that its provisions 
are not applicable to charterparties or to bills of lading issued pursuant to 
them unless such bill "governs the relation between the carrier and the 
holder" i.e. it has been issued or negotiated to a party other than the 
charterer. 
The Hamburg Rules according to Article ٢, are applicable to all 
contracts of carriage of goods by sea between two different states if, 
according to the contract, either the port of loading or the port of discharge is 
located in a contracting state, if the goods are discharged at an optional port 
of discharge stipulated in the contract and that port is in a contracting state, 
or if the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract is issued in 
a contracting state.  In addition to those cases, the Hamburg Rules apply if 
the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage 
provides that the rules are to apply. 
٢- Period of responsibility: 
i- Under the Hague/Visby Rules: 
 Article ١ (c) states that carriage of goods does not necessarily refer to 
performance of the entire contract, but merely relevant to that part of 
contract relating to sea transport for example sea leg of the intermodal 
carriage.  This period is normally known as “tackle to tackle” period, that is 
from the time when the ship tackle is hooked onto the cargo at the port of 
loading until the hook of the tackle is released at the port of discharge.  Thus 
in Pyrene Co V. Scandia Navigation Co٨٧ whilst a fire tender was being 
loaded on board a vessel in London, but before it had crossed the ship’s rail, 
it was dropped and damaged through the negligence of the stevedores 
employed by the shipowners.  No bill of lading was ever issued, but the 
shipowners claimed that they could limit their liability under the Hague 
Rules because transaction under which the goods were shipped was a 
“contract of carriage covered by a bill of lading” within the meaning of 
Article ١(b). It was held that this contention was correct. It is clear that the 
carrier assumes liability, not only during actual carriage, but also during the 
loading and discharge operations, as where the cargo falls back dock side 
while being lifted aboard with the ship’s tackle, or where it falls into the sea 
while being discharged into lighters, as in Goodwin Ferreira & Co V. 
                                                 
٨٧ - id. 
lamport & Holt Ltd٨٨, in which the plaintiff’s goods (bales of cotton yarn) 
had been discharged into a lighter. A case containing iron pipes which was 
being lowered into the lighter broke and the pipes fell out and holed her. 
Seawater flowed in and damaged the plaintiff’s goods. It was held that 
discharge of the plaintiff’s goods was not completed while other goods were 
being loaded into the same lighter and that the Rules therefore applied. 
 Article VII provides that the parties are free to negotiate their own 
terms in respect of care of cargo before loading and after discharge. It is 
difficult to state what law applies after discharge.  It may be the law of the 
place where the bill of lading was issued, the law which the bill of lading 
invokes, the law of country of discharge or the custom of the port of 
discharge٨٩.  It has been submitted, however, that no matter what is law, the 
carrier is under duty to load and discharge carefully٩٠. As in The Astir٩١, 
where damage occurred to iron plates from a leaky drum of acetic acid 
stowed on top of them. After discharge, sound plates were mingled with the 
damaged ones. It was held that the carrier was liable for damage which 
occurred while discharging as the result of mingling defective cargo with 
sound cargo. 
                                                 
٨٨ - (١٩٢٩) ٣٤ LILR ١٩٢. 
٨٩- Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, ١٧٦ (١٩٦٥). 
٩٠ - Art . III r (٢) 
٩١ - (١٩٤٥) AMC ١٠٦٤. 
             The Act of ١٩٥١ provides for the same period of “tackle to tackle” 
in Article I “carriage of goods” covers the period from the time when the 
goods are loaded onto the time when they are discharged from the ship”. 
Article VII gives the parties the liberty to negotiate their own contract for the 
period before loading and after discharge. The courts in the Sudan normally 
apply the laws and regulations of the port in this respect. The Owners of 
Charching Vessel V. Hatim Abed El Bagi٩٢, may give a good illustration.  
The plaintiff’s claimed damages for electrical apparatus shipped by them on 
the vessel “Charching” and sank after it had been discharged on a lighter in 
Port Sudan. On Applying the General Regulation of the Port Corporation, 
the Supreme Court held that the port authority is not liable, although the 
lighter belonged to it, and that the process of discharging in lighter is 
generally within the sea carriage period, which was completed only when 
the goods were delivered to consignee. Thus the carrier is liable for 
damages. It can be noticed that the decision in this case considers liability of 
the carrier to cover not only the sea carriage which was completed by 
discharging the cargo, but it extends to the actual delivery of the cargo by 
the consignee. The Bill of ١٩٩٩ comes in line with the decision in 
“Charching” case and imposes liability on the carrier from the time he 
                                                 
٩٢ - Supreme Court decision, No ١٤٦٣./١٩٩٣; cited in M. Ali Khalifa, Ahma Elgadya 
Elbahria , ٦٣٩ et seq (١٩٩٩). 
undertakes the cargo on his charge until the time it has been delivered to the 
consignee٩٣. The question is whether such a provision is contrary to the 
Hague/Visby Rules? The answer may be in negative in the sense that once 
the Rules do not provide for the time before loading and after discharge that 
means no bars are imposed by the Rules on the national legislation to 
provide for “before loading" and “after discharge" periods. 
                                                 
٩٣ - s. ١٨٧ r. (١) and s. ١٩٤. 
 ii- Under Hamburg Rules:  
            Hamburg Rules are designed to operate throughout the entire period 
“during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading 
during the carriage and at the port of discharge”٩٤.  
            Article ٤ (٢) deems the carrier to be in charge of the goods in a 
number of circumstances, for example, where they have been taken over 
from the shipper, its agents or port authority. The carrier remains in charge 
until the goods are delivered to the consignee or placed at its disposal or 
handed over to port authority. Article ٤ rule ٢ (b) (ii) allows the carrier to 
“deliver” by placing the goods at the disposal of the consignee “in 
accordance with the contract”. Finally it is clear that this provisions is 
designed to overcome the existing “before loading" and “after discharge" 
problem under the Hague/Visby Rules.٩٥ 
٣- Specific provisions for particular cases: 
i- Liability for delay: 
          The Hague/Visby Rules contain no specific provision for the recovery 
of   loss caused by delay in delivery of the cargo.  If delay results in physical 
damage to the goods, for example, by deterioration in quality, loss may be 
                                                 
٩٤ - Art. ٤ (١). 
٩٥ -John F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea,  ٢١٣-٢١٤ (٤th ed ٢٠٠١); Nicholas 
Gaskell, Regina Asariotis and Yvonne Baatz, Bills of Lading Law and Contract, ٢٦٤ – 
٢٦٥ (٢٠٠١). 
recoverable under Article III rule ٢, which imposes a general duty of care in 
handling the cargo. The position is not clear with regard to purely economic 
loss, such as loss of market. Some countries expressly provide for the 
recovery of such loss in their maritime codes,٩٦ while the English authorities 
tend to support the notion that there can be liability for delay under the 
contract where this is within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, 
according to the test of Haedley V. Baxendale٩٧.Thus in The Subro Valour٩٨ 
it was held that under the Hague/Visby Rules there can be liability for 
consequential loss, including that caused by delay, although it does not 
appear that there was argument on whether such losses were covered by the 
Rules themselves. 
          Hamburg Rules in order to remove all doubts and to bring carriage by 
sea in line with the three other modes of international transport٩٩ expressly 
provide that the carrier is liable for loss resulting from delay in delivery 
unless he can discharge the standard burden of proof i.e. that neither he nor 
                                                 
٩٦ -  e.g. Art.١٣٠ of the Swedish Maritime code and Art ١٤٩ of the Merchant Shipping 
code of USSR 
٩٧ - (١٨٥٤) ٩ Exch ٣٤١. 
٩٨ - (١٩٩٥)١ Lloyd’s Rep. ٥٠٩. 
٩٩ - See Art. ١٩ of Warsaw convention (١٩٩٩) The carrier is liable for damage occasioned 
by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage or goods .See similar provisions in 
Art .١٧ (i) of the CNR (Road) convention in ١٩٥٦ and Art .٢٧ (i) of CNR (Road) 
convention ١٩٦٢. 
his servants or agents were at fault١٠٠  Article ٥ (١) (٢) defines delay as 
occurring when the goods have not been delivered at port of discharge 
within the time agreed in contract of carriage. One practical difficulty is that 
few bills specify any time of arrival. Article ٥ (٢) continues by reference to 
the time which it would be reasonable to require of a diligent carrier, having 
regard to the circumstances of the case. Professor Gaskell criticizes the 
provision on the basis that it is controversial and carriers feared open– ended 
liability, and it may encourage carriers to insert sort of clauses that states “it 
is hereby agreed that the time for delivery of the goods shall be six months 
from the date of shipment”١٠١.      
           As far as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ is concerned, no 
difference is observed if it is compared to the Hague/Visby Rules i.e. no 
provision for liability for delay is included. But the decisions of the Sudan 
courts tend to entitle the cargo owner to damages in cases of delay in 
delivery, which result in economic loss or in damage to cargo. Two cases 
may illustrate this tendency.  In  Jameel Kababa & Son’s Co ltd and other V. 
Curtead earges (vessel)١٠٢ in which the plaintiffs shipped ٦ ٣٠٠ tons of 
cement on ١٢ October ١٩٩٦, from a port in China to be delivered at Port 
                                                 
١٠٠ - Art. ٥ (١). 
١٠١ - Gaskell, supra note ١٠, at ٣٤٢ – ٣٤٣. 
١٠٢ -  province ct No ١٧٧ / ١٩٩٧; cited in M. Ali Khalifa, supra note ٧, at ٢١٤ et seq. 
Sudan.  The ship delayed, and cargo had not been delivered to plaintiffs till 
٢٢ February ٩٧. On a claim for damages, the court held that they are entitled 
to damages for delay. Two comments may be stated about this decision. 
First, the court did not specify which international convention was to be 
applied, whether the Hague/Visby Rules or Hamburg Rules.  In spite of that 
it applied Hamburg Rules although Sudan has not signed or acceded to it. 
The second comment is that the court did not examine whether the damage 
was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract or not 
i.e. the test of “remoteness of damage" which is well established in law of 
contract jurisprudence in Sudan courts١٠٣. The second decision is the Owners 
of “Mermaid” V. The Unified Overseas Projects,١٠٤ in which the 
correspondants shipped on ١٢ April ١٩٩٣, ٢٥٠٠ Metric tons of 
(Eljeer Elmatfi  ) from Ras Elkhma to Port Sudan, to be delivered on June 
١٩٩٣. Delivery had been delayed till ٣١ October ١٩٩٣. Correspondents 
claimed damages for delay of delivery. It was held that the correspondents 
were entitled to damages for the cargo damaged as the result of delay, and 
rejected the claims for other losses, which resulted from delay. The Court of 
Appeal in reversing the decision of the District Court successfully relied on 
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١٠٤ - Ct. of App. No. ١٨٠/١٩٩٥; cited in M. Ali Khalifa, supra note ٧, at ٢٢٩ et seq. 
the principle of “remoteness of damages” although no mention of it in the 
merits. 
             The Bill of ١٩٩٩ based on the tendency of the courts in Sudan to 
entitle cargo owners for damages in cases of delay in delivery, introduces a 
provision to the effect, section ١٩٦ which imposes liability on the carrier for 
delay in delivery, and it exempts delay resulting from any of the acts 
included in section ١٨٧.١٠٥  Section ١٩٦ deems that the carrier is delayed in 
delivery if the cargo has not been delivered in the time in which the prudent 
carrier does in the similar circumstances. One can gather that the wording of 
section ١٩٦ of the Bill of ١٩٩٩ is extended to the carrier liability in cases of 
delay beyond the consequential loss authorized in English decisions that 
apply the Hague/Visby Rules. Nevertheless, the courts in Sudan may restrict 
the scope of liability, on application, of the Bill to the consequential loss in 
accordance with the general principle of “remoteness of damage” and the 
jurisprudence on the application of the Hague /Visby Rules in other 
jurisdictions.  
ii- Dangerous goods:  
           The Hague/Visby and the Hamburg Rules contain special provisions 
dealing with dangerous goods. It should be noted that in Article ١٣ of 
                                                 
١٠٥ - The general exceptions. 
Hamburg Rules the shipper is required to mark or label dangerous goods 
appropriately and the meaning of “dangerous goods is not defined. The 
Hague and Hague/Visby Rules deal in Article IV rule ٦ with “goods of 
inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to shipment”.  “Goods of a 
dangerous nature” connotes goods “which either actually causes physical 
damage or which pose a threat of physical damage to the ship or to other 
cargo on board"١٠٦, whereas under the common law contraband that may 
cause the vessel to be detained or delayed has been held to be dangerous 
cargo.١٠٧ Where goods are shipped without notice of their dangerous 
qualities the shipper will be liable for any damage resulting either to vessel 
or to any other cargo on board.  
            The orthodox view is that such liability is strict and in no way 
dependent on the knowledge available to the shipper as to the nature of the 
goods. This view stems from the majority decision in Brass V. Mail Land١٠٨ 
where a consignment of bleaching powder containing chloride of lime 
corroded the casks and damaged other cargo in the hold. The majority of the 
court took the view that the shipper would be liable even though he was 
unaware of the dangerous nature of the goods. Although there is a strong 
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dissenting opinion to the judgment in this case, it seems much more just and 
expedient that the loss occasioned by the dangerous qualities of the goods 
and the insufficient packing should be cast upon the shipper than upon the 
shipowner as a matter of allocation of risk. The situation, however, has been 
greatly clarified by the recent decision in The Giannis NK١٠٩, in which a 
cargo of groundnuts extraction meal pellets had been shipped in Dakar for 
carriage to Dominican Republic under a bill of lading incorporating the 
Hague Rules. On arrival at the port of discharge the cargo was found to be 
infested with khapra beetle, although the infection had not spread to cargo of 
wheat in an adjacent hold, but the health authorities in Dominican Republic 
ordered the shipowner either to jettison both cargoes at sea, or to return to 
port of loading. The shipowner then commenced proceedings against the 
shippers of groundnuts cargo under Article IV rule ٦ of the Hague Rules for 
damages for delay and other costs, together with an indemnity to cover any 
claims by the owners of the cargo of wheat. The House of Lords in holding 
that the shipper of groundnuts was liable to damages established two 
important remarks. First, that the expression “goods of dangerous nature” 
should be given abroad interpretation and not be restricted “ejusdem 
generis” to goods of an “inflammable" or explosive nature.  Nor should its 
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application be confined to goods which are liable to cause direct physical 
damage to the vessel or other cargo. Secondly, liability under Article IV rule 
٦ was strict.  It deserves attention that this decision widens the scope of what 
may constitute “dangerous goods” and imposes a heavier liability upon the 
shipper. 
         Under both the Hague/Visby and Hamburg Rules, there are two 
distinct situations: First, when the dangerous goods shipped without the 
carrier being informed properly, and he is ignorant of its dangerous 
character.١١٠ Second, when the dangerous goods are shipped with consent or 
knowledge of the carrier, and they turn out to become a danger to the ship or 
cargo. In the first occasion the carrier has the right to dispose of the goods 
without compensation and to be indemnified by the shipper against any 
damage resulting from such shipment whether to the ship or to the other 
cargoes.  In the second occasion the carrier is merely allowed to render the 
goods harmless or dispose of them without compensation, but he is not 
entitled to claim an indemnity from the shipper١١١.   
         The ١٩٥١ Carriage of Goods by Sea Act includes a typical provision 
with typical numbering to Article IV rule ٦ of the Hague/Visby Rules. A 
single divergence is observed under section ١٨٣ of the Bill of ١٩٩٩ that the 
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carrier is under a duty to prove that he was ignorant of the nature of the 
dangerous goods shipped, and that he would have declined from shipment if 
he had known the dangerous nature of the goods. 
iii- Deck cargo: 
  Under the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules Article I (c), deck cargo is 
apparently treated in the same way as live animals, i.e. it is excluded from 
the list of goods covered by the Rules, so that the carrier would be free to 
make his own contractual terms in respect of them. However, deck cargo is 
only taken outside the Rules where, it is stated in the bill as being carried on 
deck, and it is so carried.  In Sveska Traktor V. Maritime Agencies Ltd١١٢, in 
which a consignment of tractors had been shipped from Southampton under 
a bill, which conferred a liability on the carrier to stow the cargo on deck. 
When one of the tractors was washed overboard during the voyage, the 
shipowner sought to rely on a clause in the bill excluding his liability for 
loss or damage to deck cargo.  it was held that a standard liberty clause 
allowing cargo to be stowed on deck would not of itself take the carriage of 
that cargo outside the Rules, unless there was also a statement, usually on 
the face of the bill, that the goods may be carried on deck and they have 
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actually been so carried. Also in The Nea Tyhi١١٣, it was held that an on 
deck stowage of timber, contrary to an express under deck clause on the bill, 
was a breach of contract, but the carrier was still entitled to rely on the 
Hague Rules package limit.   It must be noted that the mere fact that it is 
customary in the trade for certain cargoes, such as timber or inflammable 
goods to be carried on deck is irrelevant to the question of the applicability 
of the Hague/Visby Rules, although it may indicate the implied consent of 
the shipper for carriage on deck.١١٤  
  The effect of carriage on deck without first obtaining the consent of 
the shipper traditionally amounts to a fundamental breach of contract of 
carriage which prevents the carrier in event of loss or damage to cargo, from 
relying for protection on any of the contractual terms and exceptions. If such 
a breach of contract is to be avoided, the shipper must have consented either 
expressly or impliedly, to the stowage of his cargo on deck. Some authors 
argue١١٥ that the inclusion of a general liberty clause in the bill of lading 
might suffice for this purpose, or even a clause to the effect that “carrier 
permitted to stow on deck unless shipper objects" provided that the shipper 
has sufficient notice of the clause at the time of shipment. Similarly, consent 
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would normally be implied where it is customary in the trade to ship certain 
types of goods on deck. Examples of such cargoes include timber, certain 
types of inflammable or other dangerous goods and more importantly, 
containers carried on specially designed containers ship.  They argue that 
their opinion has support in British cases.١١٦ Moreover there are often good 
commercial reasons for the absence of any clear statement to the deck 
carriage on the face of the bill of lading, as in the case of containers. The 
final location of each container will be dependent on a variety of factors 
including the possible dangerous nature of its contents, the trim of the ship 
or merely the time of its arrival at the dock side. On the other hand, this 
view is strongly contested by Tetley,١١٧ who argues that the presence of 
printed liberty clause in a bill of lading is insufficient to constitute implied 
consent unless it is accompanied by a clear statement on the face of the bill 
that the goods have in fact been shipped on deck. In his view the liberty 
clause is no more than an option, while the absence of a clear statement in 
the bill amounts to an assurance that the option has not been exercised. 
  Under Hamburg Rules, deck cargo is treated as normal cargo subject 
to the Rules. The Rules make the sensible distinction between shipments on 
deck contrary to an express under deck obligation and carriage on deck 
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without express permission. Under Article ٩ (١) carriage on deck is 
permitted in accordance with an agreement with the shipper, the usage of the 
particular trade, or by statutory rules.  It is clear from Article ٩ (٢) that a 
liberty clause would be such an agreement. In absence of such a statement 
the carrier has to prove an agreement, but cannot do so in respect of a third 
party.  If there is deck stowage without permission the carrier will be liable 
for the loss or damage resulting from deck stowage, (for example heavy 
weather damage) even where it is not at fault.  If there is deck stowage 
contrary to an express under deck agreement the carrier will lose the right to 
limit.١١٨  
   Both the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ and the Bill of ١٩٩٩ are 
in line with the Hague/Visby Rules. The Act of ١٩٥١ states a definition of 
“goods" which excludes the deck cargo from the application of the Act. The 
Bill of ١٩٩٩ devotes a single section with the same provision to deck cargo, 
instead of excluding it from definition of goods.١١٩ 
iv- Live animals:  
“Live animals" is the second kind of goods which is expressly 
excluded from the application of the Hague/Visby Rules in Article ١ (c). and 
similarly Article (١) c. of the Act of ١٩٥١ and section ١٩٥ of the Bill of 
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١٩٩٩. So in this case the parties are free to negotiate their own terms of 
carriage.  The exclusion is justified by the peculiar risk attached to the 
carriage of live animals arising from the inherent propensities of the animals 
involved. Few carriers would regularly carry large numbers of animals, 
although there is a thriving trade in sheep to the Middle East and the Sudan 
is one of the live animals' exporters. Such “bulk” shipments in specialized 
ships are likely to be made on the basis of special terms, but the 
Hague/Visby Rules may be contractually incorporated to such carriage i.e. 
by inclusion of clause paramount in the bill of lading.١٢٠ 
     Hamburg Rules adopt the policy of bringing all cargoes within the scope 
of its application, and then making special provision when necessary. With 
respect to live animals, Article ٥ (٥) states that “The carrier is not liable for 
loss, damage or delay in delivery resulting from any special risks inherent in 
that kind of carriage".  The carrier is not liable if he proves that he has 
complied with any special instructions given to him by the shipper 
respecting the animals.  On the other hand, if there is proof that all or a part 
of the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from fault or neglect on the 
part of the carrier, his servants or agents, then the carrier is liable for such 
loss or damage.      
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  This provision alters the general “reversed” burden of proof under 
Article ٥ (١) by requiring the cargo owner to prove that loss resulted from 
fault of the carrier. However, to raise the presumption that loss was caused 
by inherent risks the carrier must first prove that it followed the instructions 
of the shipper about carrying of animals. It seems that the first sentence is 
the overriding principle, so that fault or neglect in the final phrase should be 
read subject to it١٢١. 
 V- Deviation: 
   It is an ancient doctrine of common law under which the carrier was 
regarded as guilty of fundamental breach of contract, in cases of geographic 
departure from the contractual route of the voyage. As a result it will be 
deprived from protection of exceptions and limits of liability as in Joseph 
Thorley V.  Orchis Co.١٢٢  In this case, goods was shipped under a bill of 
lading, which contained an exception of negligence of stevedores in 
discharging the ship. The ship deviated from the voyage described in bill of 
lading. The cargo was damaged by the negligence of the stevedores in 
discharging the cargo. It was held that the deviation deprived the shipowners 
of the benefit of the exception and he was liable for the damage.  In 
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common law it was always a defense if a ship deviated in order to save life, 
but it was not justifiable to deviate to save property, for example, by taking 
another ship in tow١٢٣. Article IV rule ٤ of the Hague/Visby Rules was 
specifically enacted to widen the rather narrow justifications permitted 
under common law. It provides “Any deviation in saving or attempting to 
save life or property at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed 
to be an infringement or breach of these Rules or of the contract of carriage, 
and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting 
therefrom”. The paragraph makes no attempt to define the concept of 
deviation, but merely specifies the types of deviation which are justifiable 
under the Rules. Presumably there is no intention to disturb the well-
established common law principles. English courts have, however, 
experienced some difficulty in interpreting the phrase “any reasonable 
deviation”. It is generally accepted that what constitutes a reasonable 
deviation is to be treated as a question of fact. Thus in Stage Line V. 
Foscolo Mango & Co١٢٤, a vessel on a voyage from Swan Sea to 
Constantinople made a slight deviation to St lves to land two engineers who 
had been taken on board for the purpose of testing her fuel – saving 
apparatus. On leaving St lves, the vessel ran aground and the cargo was lost. 
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It was held that this was not a reasonable deviation and refused to allow the 
shipowner to rely on the protection afforded by the Hague Rules. It is 
relevant to note that the English courts adopt a very restricted interpretation 
to the term “reasonable deviation”. Therefore there are remarkably few 
reported English cases in which a carrier has successfully invoked the 
defence. It is submitted that an English court could still deprive the carrier 
of right to rely on Hague Rules exceptions, under Article IV rule ٢, where 
there has been an unreasonable deviation, but the protection afforded by 
limit of the liability will apply in such cases١٢٥. 
           Hamburg Rules ١٩٧٨ make no special provision for deviation 
whatsoever, and Article ٥ (٦), the equivalent of Article IV rule ٤ of the 
Hague Rules, does not mention the word. The general comprehensive 
liability scheme of the Hamburg Rules, simply regulates liability according 
to fault under Article ٥. If a deviation causes loss, the carrier will be liable 
unless it can disprove fault. There will be no need to ask whether there has 
been a technical deviation or not, as the requirement is that there must be a 
causative link between the carriers actions and any loss. It is to be noted, 
however, that Article ٥ (٦) has narrowed the justification for deviations 
provided for in Article IV rule ٤. of the Hague Rules. The carrier is now 
                                                 
١٢٥ - Gaskell, supra note ١٠, at ١٩٨; Wilson, supra  note ١٠, at ٢٠. 
excused from liability where loss, damage or delay results from any 
measures to save life or from “reasonable measures to save property at sea” 
It is submitted that, as a matter of interpretation, the Hamburg Rules ١٩٧٨, 
should not be made subject to the doctrine of deviation, unless there is a 
clear provision to the contrary in the contract١٢٦. 
   The carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ includes similar provision to 
the Hague/Visby in Article IV rule (٤). We can find no authority that the 
Sudanese courts recognize the doctrine of deviation.  The Bill of ١٩٩٩ 
contains the same provision as one of the exceptions in Article ١٨٧ rule (w).  
We have already criticized the inclusion of addition exceptions as it is not 
permitted under the Hague/Visby Rules Article v. The draftsmen of the Bill 
might have been affected by the absence of the doctrine of “deviations” in 
the practice of Sudan courts to the extent that they felt it makes no 
difference to be included as an exception instead of provided for 
independently, in spite of that no one can say that the doctrine is completely 
unknown in our courts. Most of the bills of lading normally include clauses 
as liberty clauses, for example, concerning the “deviation" and its effect to 
the contract of carriage by sea.   
 ٥- Conclusion: 
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The Hague/Visby Rules are basically designed to be applied to bill of 
lading or similar document of title.  Thus the Hague/Visby Rules do not 
apply to non-negotiable bills of lading i.e. waybills and straight bills, but it 
can be contractually incorporated. Conversely, the Hamburg Rules generally 
apply to contracts of carriage by sea "whereby the carrier undertakes against 
payment of freight to carry goods by sea from one port to another".  It is 
immaterial under Hamburg Rules whether a bill of lading or a non-
negotiable receipt is issued. 
The new convention, however, follows its predecessors in that its 
provisions are not applicable to carriage covered by charterparty or by bill of 
lading issued in pursuant to it in the hands of the charterer, except if there is 
a provision to that effect included in the bill of lading or the charterparty. 
The geographical scope of application of the Hague/Visby Rules 
envisages an international contract of carriage "between ports in different 
states".  It covers the bill of lading issued in a contracting state or where the 
carriage is from a contracting state, also where the bill expressly 
incorporates the Rules. 
The application of Hamburg Rules is similarly restricted to 
international contracts of carriage by sea.  The range of voyages covered by 
Hamburg Rules is roughly similar to those enumerated by the Hague/Visby 
Rules, with one important divergence i.e. that it covers both inward and 
outward carriage. 
The application of both conventions is merely relevant to the sea 
transport only for example sea leg of intermodal carriage.  This period is 
restricted from "tackle to tackle" under Hague/Visby Rules.  Hamburg Rules 
extend the period to cover the entire carriage, from the time when the goods 
have been taken over from the shipper until the goods are delivered to the 
consignee or placed at its disposal. 
The Hague/Visby Rules do not provide for liability for delay in   
delivering the goods.  The courts applying the rules, generally, used to 
indemnify cargo owner for consequential loss.  Hamburg Rules fill this gap 
by expressly providing that the carrier is be liable for loss resulting from 
delay in delivery unless he can discharge the standard burden of proof i.e. 
neither he nor his servants or agents were at fault. 
  The Hague/Visby Rules define dangerous goods as "goods of 
inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to shipment".  No such 
definition is found under Hamburg Rules.  Both conventions distinguish 
between two situations: When the dangerous cargoes are shipped with notice 
of their dangerous qualities and when such notice is lacking.  In the first 
situation the carrier is entitled to dispose of them or to render them harmless 
without being liable to damages for the shipper.  In the second situation the 
carrier has the right to dispose of them without compensation, but in addition 
he is entitled to damages for any resultant damage in the ship or in the other 
cargoes on board. 
The orthodox view is that such liability is strict and in no way 
dependant on the knowledge available to the shipper as to nature of the 
goods. 
The deck cargoes and the live animals are excluded from the list of 
goods covered by the Hague/Visby Rules.  Thus the carriers are free to make 
their own contractual terms in respect of them.  Deck cargo is only taken 
outside the Rules where it is stated in the bill as being carried on deck and it 
is so carried.  There is a considerable debate whether the liberty clause or 
usage of trade may constitute an agreement for a cargo to be carried on deck.  
The effect of carriage on deck without the actual or implied consent of the 
shipper traditionally amounts to fundamental breach of contract of carriage, 
which deprives the carrier from relying on the contractual terms or 
exceptions.  Hamburg Rules regard the deck cargo as under deck cargo 
subject to the Rules.  It deems that there is permission for a cargo to be 
carried on deck: if there is an agreement to this effect or if the usage of the 
trade or the statutory law permits such carriage. 
Deviation, i.e. geographical departure from the contractual route of 
the voyage, is justifiable according to the Hague/Visby in cases of deviations 
to save life or property at sea, or any other reasonable cause. Otherwise 
deviation is deemed to be an infringement of the Rules and breach of 
contract of carriage. The question of whether a deviation is reasonable or not 
is a question of fact. If the deviation is unjustifiable under the Rules the 
carrier is deprived, according to the English courts, from relying on the 
Hague/Visby exceptions, and the protection afforded by limit of liability. No 
mention of the doctrine of deviation under Hamburg Rules, but if a deviation 
causes loss or damage, the carrier will be liable according to the principle of 
the “presumed fault". 
Chapter Three 
Limits of Liability and Limits of Actions 
 
 
 
 
 
          This chapter discusses limitation of liability under the Hague/Visby 
Rules and Hamburg Rules. It will discuss limitation of liability generally 
and in cases of containers; the scope of application of the Rules; the 
monetary  unit; unit of account and cases in which limits should be broken. 
Finally it considers the limitation of actions under both conventions in two 
facets “notice of loss" and “time bars”.   
١- Limits of Liability: 
 The concept of limitation of liability dates back to the sixteenth 
century and was originally designed to encourage investment in shipping. 
While the justification for its continued retention nowadays is less evident. 
It still serves two useful purposes: First, it protects a carrier from the risk 
associated with cargoes of high-undisclosed value. Secondly, it realizes 
cheaper and uniform freight rates by establishing a standard level of 
liability. Two problems face the draftsmen of an international convention 
seeking to establish a formula for limitation of liability, i.e. selection of an 
appropriate quantities unit of goods by which to calculate the carrier’s 
overall liability and to agree on a monetary unit on which to base the 
minimum liability. 
i- Limits of liability Under the Hague/Visby Rules:        
    Article IV rule ٥ of the Hague Rules limits the liability of the carrier 
to ١٠٠ gold values, per package or unit unless the nature and value of the 
goods had been declared in the bill before shipment. Article IX Para (١) 
states that the monetary units mentioned in the convention were to be taken 
to “gold value”. The United Kingdom in implementing The Hague Rules in 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٢٤ initially interpreted the figure as ١٠٠ 
Sterling, while many other signatories to the convention converted the 
amount into equivalent sums in their own currencies. Inflation over 
succeeding years has resulted in these limits now bearing little relation to 
the actual damage suffered by cargo owners, but few states have seen it fit to 
amend their respective figure in the light of this development. Problems 
have also arisen in many countries in interpreting the term “package” and 
“unit” as used in the formula. What constitutes a “package”? Is size relevant 
and is it essential that the article carry some form of wrapping? Again is the 
term “unit” intended to refer to a shipping unit, such as crate, package or 
container, or would it equally apply to freight unit i.e. the unit of 
measurement used to calculate the freight? There is little authority on these 
points in English law. The issue has attracted little litigation probably due to 
the fact that the terms” package” and “unit” have been used interchangeably, 
the word” unit” having been interpreted as meaning “shipping unit" while 
there has been considerable ligitation in United States.  In Falconbridge V. 
Chemo,١٢٧  a tractor was held to be package as it was the physical unit 
which was being shipped.  In, The Nea Tyhi,١٢٨ the package limit was 
applied to crates of ply wood and it was held that an on deck stowage of 
timber, contrary to an express, under deck clause on the bill, was a breach, 
but the carrier was still entitled to rely on The Hague Rules package limit. In 
Bekol B.V.Terracina Shipping Corporation,١٢٩  it was held that for the 
purposes of the Hague Rules, bundles of timber were packages, as opposed 
to the individual pieces of timber within each bundle. In this case timber 
was banded with steel straps and the bills of lading described the goods as 
“x bundles stc (said to contain) y pieces”.  
       The Protocol of ١٩٦٨ i.e. the Hague/Visby Rules, retained the 
“package or unit” limitation of liability for the individual items of cargo of 
high value, but also introduced an alternative formula based on the weight of 
the cargo, the shipper being entitled to invoke whichever alternative 
produces the higher amount. Presumably the old case law interpreting the 
terms “package or unit” will still be valid, while the alternative limitation 
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“per kilo of the gross weight” will be particularly relevant in the case of 
bulk cargoes. Tetley suggests that, what is package is a question of fact to be 
decided by the court, and he accepts the American term of “customary 
freight unit” as an interpretation to the term “unit” under the Hague Rules.  
He thinks that it is a way of clarification as it seems to be much more 
explicit term than “unit”١٣٠. Finally he defines a unit as to be “some 
unpacked object". Usually, the unit is described on the bill of lading, for 
example “one lift van”, “one uncrated automobile” 
 a- Containers:   
      In The River Gurara١٣١, the English courts had to consider, for the 
first time, the application of the Hague Rules limits to containers, A vessel 
on a voyage from west Africa had run a ground on the coast of Portugal and 
later sank with total loss of cargo .Much of the cargo was containerized and 
was shipped under bills of lading incorporating the Hague Rules. Many of 
the containers had been stuffed privately by the shippers and were covered 
by bills stating that they were “said to contain" a given number of items 
such as pallets, crates, cartons or bags. The point at issue was whether the 
cargo owner’s right of recovery was limited to ₤١٠٠ per container or ₤١٠٠ 
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per individual item listed on the bill. The Court of Appeal adopted the 
United States approach in holding that, where the contents of the container 
were individually listed in the bill, each item would prima facie constitute “a 
package" for limitation purposes.  
   The problem of containers has been solved by new Article IV rule ٥ 
(c) introduced by the Hague/Visby Rules, which reads “where a container, 
pallet or similar article of transport used to consolidate goods, the number of 
packages or units enumerates in the bill of lading as packed in such article 
of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose 
of this paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except as 
aforesaid such article of transport shall be considered the package or unit”.  
  The adoption of this formula is certainly in the right direction, but 
certain ambiguities remain which require clarification. First, what is meant 
by a “similar article of transport … used to consolidate goods"?  Would a 
roll on/roll off lorry or wagon fall within this category? Secondly, an 
interpretation of the phrase “units enumerated in the bill of lading” will be 
required. Does this mean units as listed by the shipper or only those 
acknowledged by the carrier as required by Article III rule ٣ (b)? In respect 
of the latter it will be remembered that no acknowledgment as to quantity of 
cargo shipped is required from the carrier unless he has reasonable 
opportunity to check. As a substantial proportion of containers are now 
packed and sealed by the shipper before delivery to the carrier, it is only to 
be expected that the carrier will take advantage of this provision for his own 
protection by endorsing the bill “said to contain” or “contents unknown". If 
the container in question should subsequently be lost overboard without any 
further opportunity of inspecting its content, what is the extent of the 
carrier’s liability? The wording of the Article suggests that, even in such an 
event, the units of limitation will be the items listed on the bill and not the 
container itself, and this should certainly be the result in cases where the 
carrier has adjusted the freight in response to such itemization. Thus doubt 
remains as to whether the new container formula will be of any material 
benefit to the cargo owners١٣٢.  
b- Monetary Unit: 
   So far as the monetary unit of limitation is concerned, the drafters of 
the Hague/Visby Rules abandoned the Pound Sterling in favour of Poincare 
franc in an attempt to devise a “currency” which would retain its value 
during a period of inflation. The franc was defined in Article IV rule ٥ (d) as 
“a unit consisting of ٦٥٫٥ milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness ٩٠٠” 
and it was further provided that the date of conversion of the sum awarded 
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into national currencies should be governed by the law of the court seized of 
the case. Article IV rule ٥ (a) provides that the limit of liability is ٦٦٦ ٦٧ 
units of account per package or unit or units of account per kilo of gross 
weight of the goods lost or damaged whichever the higher. The Poincare 
franc has in turn been replaced as the unit of account by the Special 
Drawing Right, (SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund, as 
the result of the Additional Protocol of ١٩٧٩. 
   Two further problems associated with the operation of the 
Hague/Visby limitation rules remain to be discussed, namely, the scope of 
application of the rules i. e what types of claims they intended to cover and 
whether the protection is afforded to the carrier only or may be extended to 
other parties engaged by him in performance of the contract of carriage? 
Secondly, in what circumstances will the carriers conduct prevent him from 
invoking the protection of the limitations provisions? 
c- Scope of application:       
  The common law doctrine of privity of contract prevents a person 
who is not a party to contract from relying on its provisions for protection 
against any claim brought against him. In Scruttons V. Midland Silicenes١٣٣, 
the House of Lords refused to allow a firm of stevedores engaged by the 
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carrier to invoke the protection of the Hague Rules limitation provision 
when sued for negligently damaging the cargo during the discharging 
operations, on the ground that he could not be regarded as a party to the 
contract of carriage.  It should be noted that Article IV bis rule I provides 
that the overall defenses and limits of liability provided by the Rules apply 
whether the action brought against the carrier is founded on contract or 
tort, while rule ٣ stipulates that should the cargo owner institute separate 
proceedings against the carrier and his servant or agent in respect of the 
same damage, the aggregate amount recoverable shall not exceed the limit 
provided by the Rules١٣٤. 
d- Breaking the limits: 
     Article IV rule ٥ (e) of the Hague/Visby Rules introduced a new 
provision, which provides a test for breaking the limits. The introduction of 
an express provision ought to remove any argument that the carrier can lose 
the right to limit on any other basis, such as deviation or stowage of cargo 
on deck contrary to an express agreement. Despite this wording, the general 
view was that the carrier could not rely on the limitation provisions if he 
was in a fundamental breach of contract, as for example, where he had 
deviated from the agreed course, or stowed the goods on deck without 
shipper's consent.  
  Moreover, the carrier, under Article IV rules ٥(e), loses the right to 
limit “if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the 
carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge 
that damage would probably result. For definition of recklessness, according 
to Wilson, the definition of the Air Convention i.e. Warsaw Convention 
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Article ٢٥, may be applied here, “It is sufficient for 
recklessness that a person should act regardless of the possible 
consequences of his acts١٣٥. While a dissenting opinion states that there are 
subtle differences and similarities between the tests in various conventions 
and care has to be taken in comparing them١٣٦.      
  Whatever the exact meaning of “recklessness”, if the test of Article 
٢٥ of the of Warsaw Convention is accepted, the cargo owner is required to 
prove the actual knowledge of the carrier, not only imputed, that the damage 
will probably and not only possibly result as a consequence of his act. If the 
same test is applied to the Hague/Visby Rules the burden of proof on the 
claimant will be, no doubt, formidable one.  
 ii- Limits of liability under Hamburg Rules:      
            Despite the strong arguments to the effect that the retention of the 
principle of limitation of liability was no longer justifiable, the drafters of 
Hamburg Rules preferred such retention on the ground that it was of benefit 
to both shipper and carrier in that it enabled the latter to calculate his risks in 
advance and to establish uniform and cheaper freight rate. Three aspects of 
the formula require special consideration, namely, the appropriate unit of 
cargo, a suitable monetary unit of account and scope of application. 
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 a- Unit of cargo: 
  The Hamburg Rules maintain the dual per package/ per kilogram 
system established in the Visby Protocol. The purpose of this system is to 
take account of the fact that the value/weight rations of goods carried by sea 
differ markedly. As sea cargo ranges from cargo such as bulk commodities, 
which have a low value relative to their weight, to cargo such as complex 
heavy machinery, which has a much higher value /weight ratio. Under this 
system, the relative low limit of ٢٫٥ units of account per kilogram would 
apply to items carried in packages or other shipping units١٣٧. The breakeven 
point is ٣٣٤ kilograms, if a package or shipping unit is under that weight, 
the per package limit would apply, above that weight, the kilogram limit 
would apply. By these provisions Hamburg Rules undoubtly resolved the 
conflict between “shipping" and freight unit”, and they introduce a system to 
the interests of high value, light weight cargo١٣٨. So far as container 
limitation is concerned Hamburg Rules have adopted the Hague/Visby 
solution preferring to construe the shipping units as the individual items 
listed in the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of 
carriage. If the contents of the container or pallet are not separately listed, 
                                                 
١٣٧ - Art . ٦ .١ (a).            
١٣٨ - The common understanding adopted by the U. N Conference on the Carriage of 
.٢١٩at , ٦note  supra ,Wilson; ١٩٧٨Goods by Sea  
then the container or pallet together with its contents are 
treated as a single shipping unit. In the case of loss or damage to the 
container or pallet itself, this will be treated as a separate unit for limitation 
purposes, provided that it is not owned or supplied by the carrier١٣٩.  
         Article ٦ (I) (b) imposes a specific limit for claims for delay against 
the carrier. This limit is to an amount equivalent to two and half times the 
freight payable for the goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight 
payable under the contract of carriage by sea. The contract in question here 
will be the bill of lading and not a charterparty, (except if in the unlikely 
event of charter incorporating Hamburg Rules). Further under Article ٦ (١) 
(c) the aggregate liability of the carrier for delay and damage to the same 
goods cannot exceed Article ٦ (١) (a) limit, above١٤٠. 
 b- The Unit of Account:      
  The draftsmen of Hamburg Rules rejected the Poincare franc as the 
unit of account in favour of Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the 
International Monetary Fund. Article ٢٦ provides that the relevant units of 
account be converted into the national currency of a state according to the 
value of such currency at the date of judgment or the date agreed upon by 
the parties. Where states are members of the International Monetary Fund, 
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the conversion of (SDR) units into the appropriate national currency 
will be in accordance with the rules of the Fund.  Where they are not 
members the method of calculation will be determined by the state itself. It 
was recognized, however, that the law of certain states may not permit a 
calculation to be made on this basis, in which case such a state may use the 
Poincare franc as the basic unit of account. 
  In cases where the (SDR) is the appropriate unit of account, Article ٦ 
(١) (a) provides that the carrier’s liability is limited to an amount “equivalent 
to ٨٣٥ units of account per package or other shipping unit, or ٢٫٥ units of 
account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, 
whichever is higher”. Alternatively, in those states permitted to use the 
Poincare franc, the corresponding limitation would be ١٢،٥٠٠ and ٣٧٫٥ 
monetary units respectively. These figures represent a ٢٥ percent increase 
on the limits presently prescribed in the Hague/Visby Rules. 
c- Scope of application:              
   While the Hague/Visby Rules entitle the carrier to limit his liability 
for cargo damage within the permitted amount “in any event”, this phrase 
has now disappeared from the corresponding limitation clause in the 
Hamburg Rules. In its place the unqualified statement that the liability of the 
carrier “is limited” to the amount specified without any further reservation 
except that contained in Article ٨, which specifically denies the carrier the 
right to limit his liability for any loss, damage or delay which results from 
an act or omission of the carrier “done with intent to cause such loss, 
damage or delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage 
or delay would probably result”. A similar clause bars a servant or agent of 
the carrier from invoking the limitation clause to cover his personal liability 
where he has displayed a similar intent or recklessness. It remains to be seen 
how the courts would interpret this formula for breaking the liability limits 
and to what extent it would extend to situations formerly covered by the 
doctrine of fundamental breach, for example, whether deviation from the 
agreed course would constitute a conduct appropriate to fulfill the 
requirements of this article, whereas it is clearly not the intention that 
unauthorized deck stowage per se should have this effect. The only 
guideline provided by the Rules is to be found in Article ٩ (١) which 
provides that “carriage of goods on deck contrary to express agreement for 
carriage under deck is deemed to be an act or omission of the carrier within 
the meaning of Article ٨١٤١.  
 The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of ١٩٥١ adopted the ancient limits 
introduced by the Hague Rules. It provides in Article IV rule ٥ “Neither the 
carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or 
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damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding ₤s١٠٠ per 
package or unit …. etc".  The shortcomings of this provision which 
encourage the limits to be amended twice, by the protocol of ١٩٦٨, 
i.e. Visby Protocol and by the additional protocol of ١٩٧٩, instead of 
encouraging law reform by the legislature it resulted in the courts to 
dispense with the limitation rules completely. 
 The Bill of ١٩٩٩ includes similar rules of limitation to that of the 
Hague/ Visby Rules in section ١٩٣, but surprisingly and contrary to the 
Hague/Visby Rules the provision gives the official authority the right to 
specify the limit! What authority? And is the limit to be specified in each 
case? And why should the Bill ignore the limits of liability under the 
Hague/Visby Rules although it incorporates them in Article ١٦٩ (١)? No 
answer is available. 
٢- Limits of Actions:           
In case of loss or damage to cargo, it is normal for the shipper or 
consignee to seek damages available to him from the shipowner. Two 
situations can be distinguished: First, when the event causing the loss is 
covered by any of the exceptions provided for in Article III rules (a) – (q) of 
The Hague/Visby Rules, the claimant is entitled to damages subject to the 
limit of liability provided for in the Rules. The other situation is in cases of 
the shipowner being in default, i.e. as when the goods carried on deck 
without notifying the shipper or stating such a fact in the bill of lading, and 
in cases of deviation and negligence committed by the shipowner. In these 
situations the shipowner is not entitled to limit liability and so the damages 
are to be estimated according to the normal rules in Hadley V. Baxendale١٤٢, 
and all principles operate including remoteness of and mitigation of damage.        
i- Notice of loss: 
The Hague and Hague/Visby Rules Article III rule ٦ provides that 
unless notice of loss of, or damage to, the goods, indicating the general 
nature of such loss or damage, have been given in writing to the carrier or to 
his agent at the port of discharge before the goods are removed e.g. by the 
consignee, within three days, the removal will be prima facie evidence that 
the delivery has been in accordance with the bill. The notice of loss has been 
split into two parts for apparent and non – apparent loss respectively. In the 
former instance the notice must be given immediately at the time of 
discharge while in the later three days is available for the claimant to give 
such notice. It is accepted universally that bad order receipts are, in effect, 
notice in writing. There is one exception to the notice, and that is where 
there has been a joint survey or inspection. It should be noted that the joint 
survey must be “at the time” of receipt of the goods. It is to be noted 
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moreover that the carrier and receiver are bound by the Hague/Visby Rules 
to give reasonable facilities for inspecting and tallying the goods.١٤٣ 
    Hamburg Rules Article ١٩ is an equivalent provision, although it 
provides a one- day period in which to give notice, unless the damage was 
not apparent, in which case the period is ١٥ consecutive days after the goods 
were handed over to the consignee. Perhaps of more significance is Article 
١٩ (٥) which requires notice in ٦٠ days after the handing – over if there is to 
be a delay claim. Article ١٩ (٧) requires the carrier to give notice to the 
shipper if it intends to make a claim against the shipper. 
  The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ١٩٥١ contains a typical provision 
with typical numbering to that of the Hague/Visby Rules Article III rule ٦. 
Again no difference can be noted under the Bill of ١٩٩٩ section ١٩٣ except 
that, it gives the receiver three consecutive days without counting the 
holidays in cases of the non- apparent damage. As we noted before the 
Hague/ Visby is silent on whether the three days include the holidays or 
whether they are workdays. Normally the bill of lading includes a clause of 
how those three days are to be counted١٤٤. 
 ii- Time bars: 
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١٤٤ - e.g. P & O on Nedlloyd Bill include a clause of a notice within three working days. 
While ANL Tranztaz Bill of lading provides for a notice within three consecutive days. 
 a- Under the Hague/Visby Rules: 
  Under Article III rule ٦ of The Hague/Visby Rules the carrier is 
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is 
brought within one year from the date of delivery of the goods, or the date 
when the goods should have been delivered, for example, where they have 
been total loss. Any clause that seeks to reduce this period will be contrary 
to the Rules and therefore null and void.  The time limit can be extended by 
agreement between the parties after the cause of action has arisen. 
 Several points relating to this provision call for consideration:  
 First, the limitation period runs from the time the goods were 
delivered, or should have been delivered. The selection of the word 
“delivery" instead of “discharge” envisages some sort of constructive 
delivery to the consignee or his authorized agent before time will begin to 
run.  
 Secondly, the carrier is “discharged from all liability whatsoever in 
respect of the goods. This provision has been interpreted as covering not 
only the normal claim for cargo damage or loss, but also extending to claims 
arising from fundamental breach of contract by the carrier or from the type 
of misconduct listed in Article IV rule ٥ (e). 
  Thirdly, the term “suit” has been construed as including both 
litigation and arbitration proceedings. Thus in The Merak١٤٥, the bill of 
lading incorporated the terms of the charterparty which included an 
arbitration clause. Unaware of this fact, the plaintiff brought a court action 
for cargo damage and by the time this action was stayed, the ١٢ months 
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period has expired. It was held that the word” suit” includes arbitration 
proceedings and consequently the arbitration avenue was now time barred. 
Similarly, a narrow construction was applied to this requirement, that the 
suit must be brought within the relevant jurisdiction during this period. 
  Fourthly, the recent case of Clifford Maersk١٤٦, has established that 
where the final day of limitation period falls on a Sunday or other day on 
which the office of the Supreme Court is closed, suit will be brought in time 
if the claim form is issued on the next day on which the office is open. 
   Finally, it is generally accepted that the effect of this provision was 
not only to bar the remedy but also to extinguish the right. Thus in Aries 
Tanker Corp. V. Total Transport١٤٧, the defendants, in paying freight on 
receipt of cargo had made a deduction to cover short delivery. Two years 
later they were sued by the carrier for the balance of the freight and sought 
to serve a defense based on right of set- off. The court held that no such 
defense was admissible since any right on which it might initially have been 
based had been extinguished by the time lapse. 
           The Hague/Visby Rules, however, frequently provide for the carrier 
to be indemnified by a third party in the event of any successful claim being 
made against him. No such indemnity action can be launched until the initial 
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claim against the carrier has been concluded by judgment or settlement and 
this is unlikely to occur within the limitation period. Accordingly Article III 
rule ٦ bis provides that an action for indemnity may be brought outside the 
١٢ – month’s period if it is initiated within the normal limitation period of 
the court seized of the case. The paragraph provides that, in any event, a 
minimum period of three months shall be allowed from the time the party 
seeking the indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process 
in the action against him.١٤٨ 
 b- Under Hamburg Rules:              
  Under Hamburg Rules actions are time – barred if judicial or arbitral 
proceedings have not been instituted within a period of two years from the 
time the goods have been delivered or should have been delivered.١٤٩ This 
limit applies irrespective of whether proceedings have been instituted by the 
cargo owner or the carrier. This compares with a period of ١٢ months under 
the Hague/Visby Rules applicable only to proceedings against the carrier or 
the ship, has been welcomed by cargo interests, since the one year limit of 
the Hague/Visby Rules is deemed as impractically shorter, and inconsistent 
with other international conventions on transportation١٥٠. The person against 
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whom the claim is made may at any time, during the running of the 
limitation period extend that period by a declaration in writing to the 
claimant. Actions for indemnity may, of course, be instituted  
outside the basic limitation period and in this respect the Hamburg Rules 
follow their predecessors in specifying a minimum extension of ٩٠ days 
from the date on which the party seeking the indemnity “settled the claim or 
has been served with process in the action against himself"١٥١                
Similar to the Hague/Visby Rules, the Carriage of Goods by  Sea Act ١٩٥١, 
incorporating the Hague Rules, provides in Article III rule ٦ paragraph (٣): 
“In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in 
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after 
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been 
delivered”. The Bill of ١٩٩٩ has a similar provision in section ١٩٨.   
٣- Conclusion: 
  The Hague/Visby Rules retain the per package or unit limitation for 
the individual items of cargo of high value, So the definition of “unit"  
developed under the Hague Rules as “shipping unit" is valid here. 
Alternatively the Rules introduce a formula based on the weight of the cargo 
at the option of the shipper which is suitable for bulk cargoes i.e. per 
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kilogram.  Concerning the problem of containerized cargoes the Rules 
introduced a new proviso to solve the problem. Under this provision the 
number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading as packed in 
such article of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for 
the purpose of limitation. In spite of this endeavor, some ambiguities 
remained on the question of containers.  
In Considering the monetary unit of limitation, the Hague/Visby 
Rules abandoned the Pound Sterling adopted under the Hague Rules in 
favour of poincare franc, an amount not exceeding the equivalent of ٦٦٦٫٦٧ 
units of account per package or unit of gross weight of the goods lost or 
damaged, whichever is higher.  It is worth mentioning that an additional 
Protocol of ١٩٧٩ has in turn replaced the poncare franc by the special 
drawing right (SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The 
aforesaid rules of limits cover the acts of the carrier, his agents or servants, 
whether in tort or in contract, but they do not cover the act of any other 
persons who are not a party to the contract of carriage e.g. stevedores.  Also 
the limits do not cover the act of the carrier which is done intentionally or 
recklessly with knowledge that damage would probably result. 
 Under The Hague/Visby Rules in case of loss or damage to cargo two 
situations must be distinguished: where the act of the carrier is covered with 
one of the exceptions he is entitled to the limit of liability provided for under 
the Rules.  But when the carrier is in default as in cases of carriage on deck 
without the consent of the shipper, deviation or negligence, the rules of 
limits of liability do not operate. 
In cases of shortage or damage to cargo, the Rules require a notice to 
be served on the carrier or his agent before the suit can be instituted. If the 
damage is apparent the notice must be given immediately at the time of 
discharge, but if the damage is non – apparent three days are available for 
the claimant to give such a notice. When a joint survey or inspection 
effected no notice is required.  Under Hamburg Rules the time available for 
notice in cases of apparent damage is one day while the period in cases of 
non – apparent damage is extended to fifteen consecutive days after the 
goods have been handed over to the consignee.  Hamburg Rules added two 
important provisos i.e. they provide for ٦٠ days from the time of delivery 
available for notice in cases of delay and they require the same notice to be 
given in cases of claims to be brought by the carrier against the shipper, and 
this is so advantageous to the shippers’ interest. 
As far as the time bar is concerned, under the Hague/Visby Rules the 
carrier is discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless 
suit is brought within one year from the date of delivery of the goods or 
when the goods should have been delivered. Any clause to reduce this 
period is deemed to be null and void. An action for indemnity may be 
brought beyond the twelve months period if it is initiated within the normal 
limitation period of the court seized of the case. However a minimum period 
of three months from the time of settlement of the first claim is available to 
the indemnity claim. In comparison, under Hamburg Rules the time 
limitation is extended to two years from the time of delivery. It is important 
to say that the proviso applies the time bar for claims irrespective of whether 
proceedings have been instituted by cargo owner or carrier. The same period 
for indemnity claims is available under Hamburg Rules i.e. ٩٠ days. 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The conclusions reached in this study may be summarized as follows:  
The Hague/Visby Rules establish a mandatory legal regime governing 
the liability of a carrier for loss of or damage to goods carried under a bill of 
lading.  They cover period from the time the goods are loaded onto the ship 
until the time they are discharged, that is what is known as "tackle to tackle" 
period.  According to their provisions, the carrier is liable for loss or damage 
resulting from his failure to exercise due diligence to make the ship 
seaworthy, to properly man, equip and supply the ship or to make its storage 
areas fit and safe for the carriage of goods.  However, the Hague Rules 
contain a long list of circumstances that exempt the carrier from this 
liability. Perhaps the most significant of these exemptions discharges the 
carrier from liability if the loss or damage arises from the faulty navigation 
or management of the ship, i.e. the nautical fault. 
The objective of the work, which resulted in the adoption of Hamburg 
Rules of ١٩٧٨, is to remove the existing uncertainties and ambiguities in the 
existing law, Hague/Visby Rules, and to establish a balanced allocation of 
responsibilities and risks between cargo interests and the carriers. Hamburg 
Rules have achieved this objective in many respects. The most significant of 
them are: 
i. Hamburg Rules are designed to govern the rights and obligations of 
the parties, carriers per se, to a contract of carriage regardless of whether or 
not a bill of lading has been issued.  This is becoming increasingly important 
as more and more goods are carried under non-negotiable documents rather 
than bills of lading. 
Hamburg Rules itemize the types of information required to be set 
forth in the bill of lading. Among other things, these include the general 
nature of the goods, the number of packages or pieces, their weight or 
quantity, and their apparent condition.  The itemization is more extensive 
than that under the Hague/Visby Rules.  
Moreover the carrier cannot, under Hamburg Rules insert a 
reservation to the effect that the weight or quality of goods is unknown 
except if he has no means of checking or if he reasonably suspects that they 
are inaccurate.  He has to state the ground of such suspicion in the bill of 
lading.  This will fairly limit the insertion of such reservations in bills of 
lading and consequently will save time and expenses to prove the quantity or 
weight of cargo in cargo claims. 
ii. Nowadays, a carrier may enter into a contract of carriage by sea 
with a shipper but entrust the carriage or part of it, to another carrier. 
Shippers face difficulties because they have to seek compensation from the 
actual carrier. That carrier might be unknown to the shipper, might have 
effectively restricted or excluded his liability, or might not be subject to suit 
by the shipper in an appropriate jurisdiction.  The Hague Rules do not deal 
with the liability of actual carrier, but the Hamburg Rules provide for the 
liability of the actual carrier in cases of loss, damage or delay which 
occurred in the part of the voyage entrusted to him.  Otherwise both of the 
contracting carrier and the actual carrier are jointly and severally liable. 
  iii. The basis of carrier's liability under the Hague/Visby Rules was 
one of the principal concerns of the movement for reform that eventually 
resulted in Hamburg Rules.  It is based on specific duties i.e. to issue a bill 
of lading, to provide a seaworthy ship and the duty of care cargo during the 
voyage.  Those duties are subjected to seventeen exemptions.  The long list 
of exceptions are derived from the exemption clauses that commonly 
appeared in bills of lading when the Hague Rules were adopted in early 
١٩٢٠.  Perhaps the most significant of these exceptions discharges the 
carrier from liability, if the loss or damage arises from the faulty navigation 
or management of the ship, the so - called "nautical fault" exception. 
The original justifications for this liability scheme, and in particular 
the nautical fault exception, were the inability of the shipowner to 
communicate with and exercise effective control over his vessel and crew 
during long voyages at sea, and the traditional concept of an ocean voyage 
as joint adventure of carrier and owner of the goods.  However, subsequent 
developments in communications and the reduction of voyages time have 
rendered those justifications obsolete. Hamburg Rules effect a more 
balanced and equitable allocation of risks and responsibilities between 
carriers and shipper, based on the principle of “presumed fault".  It remains 
to note that the concept of the “presumed fault" is a civil law notion and it is 
unknown in the jurisdictions of the English common law.  This fact makes 
the basis of liability under Hamburg Rules unwelcome in English common 
law countries. 
iv. The Hague/Visby Rules cover only the period from the time the 
goods are loaded onto the ship until the time they are discharged from it, 
what is known as "tackle to tackle" period.  They do not cover the time 
before loading and after discharge, while Hamburg Rules apply to the entire 
period the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the 
carriage and at the port of discharge. 
v. Sea cargo carried on deck was traditionally subject to high risk of 
loss or damage.  For this reason the Hague/Visby Rules do not cover goods 
carried on deck by agreement of the parties.  However, developments in 
transport and packing techniques, and in particular containerization, have 
made it possible for cargo to be carried on deck with relative safety.  It is 
common for containers to be stored on deck in modern containers ships.  
Hamburg Rules take these developments into account. They expressly 
permit the carrier to carry goods on deck if the shipper so agrees, but also 
when such carriage is in accordance with the usage of the particular trade or 
if it is required by the law. The liability of the carrier for deck carriage is 
based on the same basis of under-deck carriage. 
vi. Historically, sea voyages were subject to innumerable 
uncontrollable hazards, which frequently resulted in delays and deviations.  
Because of this unpredictability, the Hague/Visby Rules do not cover 
liability of the carrier for delay in delivery.  However as a result of modern 
shipping technology, the proper charting of the oceans and the sophisticated 
and efficient methods of navigation, voyages have become less subject to 
delays and more predictable.  Thus Hamburg Rules govern the liability of 
the carrier for delay in delivery in the same manner as liability for loss or 
damage to the goods, i.e. in accordance with the principle of the “presumed 
fault". 
vii. The Hamburg Rules maintain the dual per package/per kilogram 
system established under the Hague/Visby Rules.  But the limits of liability 
under the Hamburg Rules are ٢٥ per cent higher than those established 
under the ١٩٧٩ Additional Protocol. 
viii. The time bar for claims under Hamburg Rules is extended to two 
years instead of one year under the Hague/Visby Rules.  This time bar 
covers claims instituted by the shipper against the carrier, but does not cover 
claims instituted by carriers against cargo owners.  Under Hamburg Rules 
the time bar covers both types of claims. 
ix. The Hamburg Rules offer the potential of achieving greater 
uniformity in the law relating to the carriage of goods by sea than do the 
Hague Rules.  Firstly, since the Hague/Visby Rules apply only when a bill of 
lading is issued, the significant and growing portion of maritime transport in 
which bills of lading are not issued is not covered by them.  Secondly even 
when the Hague/Visby Rules do apply, many aspects of rights and 
obligations of the parties to a contract of carriage are not dealt with.  A 
question or issue that is not covered by the Hague/Visby Rules will be 
resolved by rules of national law, which often produces disparate  solutions, 
or by clauses in bills of lading, which may fairly favour one of the parties 
and which may be given effect to different degrees in national legal systems. 
In spite of the noticeable progress which Hamburg Rules have 
achieved in the international legislation on carriage of goods by sea,  there 
are some reservations, namely: 
i. Hamburg Rules adopt the notions and concepts of the civil law for 
example "the presumed fault".  Hence, they are not welcome in the 
English common law countries. 
ii. The countries that apply the Hague Rules from the early ١٩٢٤, 
Sudan adopted them in ١٩٥١, find it difficult to abandon the wealth 
of precedents which are based on application of the Hague Rules 
and to turn to another system of law. Hence, many countries which 
acceded to Hamburg Rules such as United States and Australia can 
not enact them into their national legislations. 
iii. Hamburg Rules need a long time to be examined and verified, and 
for their rules to be accommodated in the international carriage of 
goods by sea, while the defects of the Hague/Visby have already 
been pinpointed through the long time of their application. 
iv. Hamburg Rules made a radical change in the concepts of carriage 
by sea which are well established for a long time and date back to 
many centuries.  This cause the major maritime countries, United 
king for example, to strongly to object its adoption.  Thus instead 
of uniformity in carriage of goods by sea legislations Hamburg 
Rules create a new division. 
For the aforesaid reasons the International Maritime Committee, in 
order to enhance the Hague/Visby Rules and in the same time maintain the 
same system of law, introduced proposals for amendments of the 
Hague/Visby Rules i.e. instrument of amendments.    
The most significant amendments included in, are the following: 
First, it widens the definition of "carrier" by including definition of 
"contracting carrier" and "performing carrier". 
Secondly, it introduces basis of liability based on the fault and neglect 
of the carrier, and imposes on the carrier general duty of care of cargo 
although it retains the general exceptions provided for in the Hague/Visby 
Rules.  The important amendment is that it abolished the exception of 
"nautical fault" and decreases the exceptions to six exceptions only. 
Thirdly, it extends the period of responsibility of the carrier from 
time of receiving of goods to time of delivery.  It covers the same 
geographical scope as that of Hamburg Rules. 
Fourthly, it covers the contract of carriage and any transport 
document whether bill of lading or waybill or any other receipt. 
Fifthly, it provides for liability for delay in delivery and deck cargo 
typically to the provision of Hamburg Rules. 
Sixthly, in limits of liability it retains the dual system of per package; 
per kilogram, but it includes special provision to solve the problem of limit 
of liability in containerized goods. 
Seventhly, it extends the time bar period to two years instead of one year 
under Hague/Visby Rules. 
From the above conclusions the following recommendations may be made: 
I recommend that Sudan should adhere to Hague/Visby Rules immediately.  
I suggest that the Bill of ١٩٩٩ be revised so as to remove its inconsistencies 
with the Hague/Visby Rules, specifically, to include definition for "goods" 
and "carrier";  to revise section ١٨٧ so as to comply with Article VI of the 
Hague/Visby Rules which provides for the general exceptions to the liability 
of the sea carriers; to revise section ١٨٨ so as to provide for the limits of 
liability in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) provided for in the Additional 
Protocol of ١٩٧٩; and  finally, to prepare an English version of the Bill. 
In short, Sudan should take part in the serious efforts going on now to 
amend and modernize the Hague/Visby Rules by the International Maritime 
Committee. 
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